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Chapter 1
Video Game Industry Overview
and Data Introduction
1.1 Video Game Industry
1.1.1 Industry Overview and Demographics
The video game market has been a fast-growing market in the past 20 years. The
total population of video gamers has increased by four times since seven years ago
and has reached almost one billion according to a presentation given by the chief
financial o cer at Electronic Arts. According to the same source, the total size
of the video game software market was larger than video rental, recorded music,
and box o ce in the year of 2008. The video game market is able to expand
at a relatively fast pace because it is able to attract more and more consumers
into the market and does not have to su↵er a huge loss of existing consumers.
Consumers who play video games at a young age tend to stay in the market as
they grow older. The annual report by Nintendo for 2010 concludes that “the
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public perception towards video games has significantly improved over the past
years”.
Traditionally, people think the video game market is for young people. This
has been changing during the past years. When the young kids grow up, they do
not simply give up playing video games. According to a report released by the
Entertainment Software Association in 2009, the current demographics of video
game players show a lot of diversity. Only 25% of game players are 18 or younger.
Almost half of the players are between 18 and 49 years old. Impressively, 26% of
these players are over 50 years old. The average age of the most frequent game
purchaser is 39 years old. Among all video game players, 40% of them are female.
This shows the gender diversity is not negligible either.
1.1.2 Strategic Competition
In the video game market, several large firms compete for market share. Accord-
ing to the annual report of Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., the competitors in
the video game software market are: Activision Blizzard, Electronic Arts, THQ,
Capcom, Square Enix, Konami, Namco-Bandai, SEGA, Ubisoft and itself. Sony,
Microsoft and Nintendo produce both software and hardware for video games.
The video game industry requires a lot of input in research and development.
All the firms invest a large amount of resources in their R&D as stated in their
annual reports. For instance, the annual report by Nintendo for 2010 shows that
Nintendo paid U42,211 million in research and development expenses, which is
the second highest among all operating expenses. During the same year, R&D
expenses were the highest among all the operating expenses for Electronic Arts,
Inc. R&D expenses consist of expenses spent on direct development and related
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overhead costs in connection with the development and production of their prod-
ucts at Electronic Arts, Inc. As pointed out by many economic studies, durable
good manufacturers adopt planned obsolescence to kill o↵ the competition from
the used good market. In order to have planned obsolescence, these firms have
to invest a fortune to develop new features for their products.
The outcomes of the R&D departments of the video game companies are not
necessarily profitable. With the fast developing technology, a company may not
be able to equip their new generation products with technologies required for or
suited to entertainment. With changing consumer preferences, newly developed
features that require high development costs may not be favored by the consumers
at the end. Timing for the hit titles’ releases is critical for the overall profitability.
Competition from other companies forces all the companies in this industry to
pay intensive attention to the development of their own products. All the reasons
listed here explain the large investment costs for the video game companies.
Overall economic fluctuations have e↵ects on video game sales as well. Many
of the major players from the video game market have su↵ered losses in the most
recent economic crisis. Their balance sheets all state that they have been able to
cover the variable costs but not the total costs. This fact shows that the sunk
costs play an extremely important role in this market.
1.2 Data Introduction
The focus of this project is video game software. The main goal of this investiga-
tion is to show the e↵ects on secondary market activities when a new generation
game has improved quality. As stated before, a considerable portion of video
game consumers will stay in the market over time. In this case, before the release
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of the newest generation game, the older generations of the respective game will
face a high demand. This abnormally high demand can be explained by two rea-
sons. The first reason is that the consumers who have already played the vintage
generation want to play it again due to memories recalled by the advertisement
of the new generation. The second reason is because some gamers, who want to
prepare themselves for the forth-coming game by warming up or getting familiar
with the story line of the game, want to play the older generations of the given
game. This high demand pushes up the used good price of the older generations.
In order to avoid this problem, I only include sports games and vehicle simulation
games. These two genres of games do not have story lines and do not have stable
characters. Since these two types of games have counter parts in real life, the
most up-to-date features will only be found in the newest generation games. This
fact makes it less likely that consumers want to play the older generation when
a newer generation is coming out.
Video game sales decline dramatically as a game ages. Therefore, it is not
worthwhile to include all the games that have ever been in the market. I include
all the sports games and vehicle simulation games that are relatively new; more
specifically, a game title will be included if the game title was released later than
January 1st, 2006. Since my data collection was almost done at the end of May
2010, any game title that has been released afterwards will not be in my data set
either. The inclusion of game titles depends on data availability as well.
The game data are organized into a three-tier hierarchy: (1) game series, (2)
game generation, and (3) game title. Specifically, a game series includes all games
that are a part of a product line. For example, NFL Madden 2009 for Xbox360
and NFL Madden 2008 for PS2 will both be in the NFL Madden game series.
A game generation includes all game titles that share the same name and are
4







Table 1.1: Generation Summaries
normally introduced in a relatively short time span. For instance, NFL Madden
2009 for Xbox360 and NFL Madden 2009 for PS3 are both game titles in the NFL
Madden 2009 game generation. A game title is specified for both game generation
and platform. NFL Madden 2009 for Xbox 360 and NFL Madden 2009 for PS3
are di↵erent game titles but both belong to the same game generation and game
series. The data set has in total 62 game series, with 325 di↵erent game titles.
The longest game series has 6 generations.1 Table 1.1 shows the frequencies of
the game series with di↵erent numbers of generations. More than half of all game
lines have two generations. I rarely have game series wth very long product lines,
5 or 6 generations. This is due to limited availability of the price and quantity
data.
A key feature of the video games market is that there are distinct platforms to
play games. A purchased game title is not compatible across di↵erent platforms,
though a game is often released on multiple platforms. That is, an Xbox360 game
will not work on a SONY PlayStation 3 console. However, it is quite common for
a game to be available across a wide range of platforms. There have been seven
generations of gaming consoles developed by related companies. and my data
1
The missing data problem is more significant for weekly quantities. I have to drop the
game titles where there is no observations for quantities or prices. In most cases, these game
titles are not popular ones or not released in the United States.
5
Platform Abbrev. Console Manufacture Frequency Percent
Nintendo DS DS Nintendo 30 9.23
Game Boy Advance GBA Nintendo 2 0.62
Game Cube GC Nintendo 1 0.31
PlayStation 2 PS2 SONY 61 18.77
PlayStation 3 PS3 SONY 56 17.23
PlayStation Portable PSP SONY 50 15.38
Nintendo WII WII Nintendo 49 15.08
XBOX 360 X360 Microsoft 66 20.31
XBOX XBOX Microsoft 10 3.08
Total 325 100
Table 1.2: Platform Summaries
include game titles that are compatible to nine platforms: Nintendo DS (DS),
Gameboy Advance (GBA), Gamecube (GC), Playstation 2 (PS2), Playstation
3 (PS3), Playstation Portable (PSP), Wii (Wii), Xbox360 (X360), and Xbox
(Xbox). Table 1.2 summarizes the proportion of observations for each platform
in the dataset. Portable consoles have less of a share in the data set, and all the
mainstream consoles, PS2, PS3, Wii, X360, and Xbox, have similar shares in the
data.
Video game developers will develop their games for variable consoles based
on their strategic decisions. Most of the big games will be compatible with and
only with the newest generation consoles. However, some newly developed games
are compatible with older generation consoles as well. It is quite common that
one video game will have multiple developers corresponding to di↵erent consoles.
Otherwise, a game developing company will have di↵erent studios owned by this
company to develop the same game for di↵erent platforms. Sometimes a game
developing company outsources the development of their products for certain
platforms to other developers, although this happens more for less popular plat-
forms. For instance, Madden NFL 2011 for Wii is a di↵erent game than Madden
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NFL 2011 for Playstation 3. In this investigation, a game title actually means a
game on only one platform. Games that are compatible with multiple consoles
show up as more than one game title in the data.
In my data set, I have three groups of variables: weekly prices of each game
title, weekly sales of each game title, and both time-variant and time-invariant
characteristics of each game title. Weekly prices are obtained from Cosmic Shovel,
Inc., weekly sales data is provided by the VGChartz group, and the characteristics
observations are collected by myself manually2.
1.2.1 Weekly Prices
Cosmic Shovel, Inc. has established websites where users can request price track-
ing for specific items sold on Amazon.com. On Amazon.com, almost all products
have new and used products on sale at the same time. For most items, Ama-
zon.com itself sells brand new products. There are third-party users who sell new
and used products. This makes every product sold on Amazon have three types
of prices: Amazon new good price, third-party new good price, and used good
price. In order to “track” a product, users only need to input the ASIN (Amazon
Standard Identification Number) for that product on CamelCamelCamel.com,
which is website administrated by Cosmic Shovel, Inc. Users are able to see a
plot of all three price trends and receive alerts regarding price changes after they
have a product “tracked”. The methodology that Cosmic Shovel, Inc. employs
to record historical prices is as follows:
• Put all products into two queues, one for products people have “tracked”
and one for all other products.
2
Refer to further discussions in later subsections of the chapter
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• Collect the lowest available price for each price type of each product.
• The length of time queue processing takes has grown along with their prod-
uct coverage, such that right now the “tracked” queue gets about 2-3 up-
dates per day and the other queue receives 1-2 updates per week.
• When queues are empty, they will be re-populated and begin again.
According to the methodology, the prices of any item are updated at least
once per week. Using related information, I am able to construct the weekly
prices for products, where these weekly prices are the last updated price in each
week.
Cosmic Shovel, Inc. does not only track product prices on Amazon.com for
the United States. It does the similar tracking job for Amazon.com for other
countries as well, such as Japan, United Kingdom, etc. Thus, every item sold on
the corresponding website has three historical price series. With price data for
the United States, Japan, and UK, I have in total nine price series for a certain
product. The data availability is best for the United States and not as good for
the other two countries. The units of each variable is the smallest currency unit
in the corresponding country. For instance, for the used good price in the United
States, the unit of the price will be in pennies.
Cosmic Shovel, Inc. started to track the prices of all items around mid-2008.
So if a product was released before that, I will not have the complete historical
price series for this product. Di↵erent game titles have di↵erent starting times
after which the historical price data became available. Some game titles were
introduced after the later half of 2008. So the availability levels of di↵erent game
titles vary across the panel.
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Figure 1.1: Trends for Three Price Series for All Games
9
Since I concentrate my investigation in the American market, I only include
price data from the main Amazon website, Amazon.com. Every product sold on
Amazon has three types of prices: an Amazon new good price (usa), a third-party
new good price (usn), and a used good price (usu). The data availability for these
three price series are almost the same. The used good price and third-party new
good price each have slightly better coverage than the Amazon new good price.
Prices are measured in cents per unit. I can clearly see the decreasing trends in
Figure 1.1. All three price series start at around 5000 cents or 50 dollars. Overall,
the average for all three price series decreases over time as game titles age. The
Amazon new good price has the highest average and the average used good price
is the lowest among the series. This is because people tend to trust Amazon.com
better than a random third party seller on the internet. I see that over the weeks
after release, the mean of all three price series decline.
The third party prices seem more fluctuated than the Amazon o cial price
after the game has been released for a year. Amazon carries a much larger
amount of products than most third party sellers. After a game title has been
out for a while, the weekly sales decline significantly. This makes Amazon.com
less interested in making a strategically competitive price for the game title.
However, this is not true for each individual seller who may be only selling a few
game titles.
The presence of strong seasonal e↵ects is not very apparent in Fig 1.1 because
the x-axis plots time as weeks since introduction of a game and di↵erent game
genres (i.e., football, baseball, hockey) have di↵erent introduction points during
a year. However, if I focus on a single game type I can observe a clear seasonal
pattern. Figure 1.2 shows the changing trends of used and new good prices
for football games. These three price trends are drawn taking the mean of the
10
Figure 1.2: Trends for Three Price Series for Football Games
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all the observations of each series in one week. The three dotted lines indicate
when a new generation of games is introduced. According to my data set, after
a football game is introduced, it takes about 51 weeks to introduce the next
generation game title. The second and third generation release dates are shown
as well – each separated by roughly a year. The red vertical lines indicate the
average releasing week for the next 3 generations. It is quite natural that a new
football game generation will be introduced to the market every 50 weeks or so,
as this follows an annual release schedule. Figure 1.2 clearly shows that before
the new generation introduction, all three prices go down. They bounce back
after the new generation has been released due largely to the Christmas shopping
season. The exception is the Amazon new price, where there is less seasonality
and less of a trend after the first year. For football games, the average new video
game price starts at about 60 dollars and the average used good price starts at
about 40 dollars. When a game title has been out in the market for more than
150 weeks and it becomes the third newest generation of its series, the used good
price drops to a level that is close to zero. However, the new good price of the
old generation products remain somewhat elevated at 20 dollars per copy.
1.2.2 Weekly Sales
VG Chartz describes itself as follows: “VG Chartz is a video game sales tracking
website that provides weekly sales figures of console software and hardware by
region. VG Chartz is ranked amongst the top 5,000 websites in the United States
and serves over 8 million page impressions per month. VG Chartz tracks the sales
data of video game consoles sold by Nintendo, Sony, and Microsoft, as well as
software for those consoles.” Thus, I have reasons to believe that VG Chartz is
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a credible source of video game weekly sales and the weekly sales estimates it
provides are among the best available estimates in the world. Plus, “VG Chartz
has been cited and featured by a number of leading worldwide publications such
as Reuters TV, The BBC, CNN Money, The New York Times, Fortune, Business
2.0, Forbes, The New York Post, The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Times,
Sddeutsche Zeitung, The Birmingham News, The Toronto Star, The Indianapolis
Star, The Inquirer, NU.nl, CNet, Seeking Alpha, OReilly Radar, Yahoo Games
and The Guinness Book of World Records.”
The VGChartz website states that all the weekly sales estimated by VG
Chartz are obtained through channels as follows:
• “Polling end users to find out what games they are currently purchasing
and playing”
• “Polling retail partners to find out what games and hardware they are
selling”
• “Using statistical trend fitting and historical data for similar games”
• “Studying resell prices to determine consumer demand and inventory levels”
• “Consulting with publishers and manufacturers to find out how many units
they are introducing into the channel”
For the best selling titles in each week, at least 3 of the 5 channels above will be
used to ensure the accuracy of their estimates. For other titles, either one or two
channels will be used to estimate the weekly sales.
VGChartz group estimates the weekly sales data for di↵erent regions of the
world. On their website, they have estimates for three regions: Americas (The
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entire North and South American Continent), Japan, and EMEAA(Europe, Mid-
dle East, Asia and Africa - every region not covered by the first two options
essentially). Similar to the price data, the data availability is the best for the
Americas and not as good for the other two regions. For a given game, I will
have three weekly sales observation series starting from the week when the game
was originally released. The three series are as follows:
• Americas: weekly sales for the North and South American countries3
• Japan: weekly sales for Japan
• EMEAA: weekly sales for every region not covered by the previous two.
Due to better data availability and the main purpose of this project, the
weekly sales for the North and South American countries are used. Figure 1.3
shows the mean weekly sales for all video game titles and all football game titles
with respect to the number of weeks after release. Football game titles have
better weekly sales on average than all game titles. A seasonal pattern is captured
from the football game sales trend. This trend is caused by the Thanksgiving
and Christmas shopping season. Football games are normally released at the
beginning of each football season (some time in August). The mean weekly
sales for football games reach the peak at around fifteen weeks after release.
The weekly sales for football game titles hardly have large increases after they
have been introduced for longer than a year. For the overall average weekly
sales, the dotted line has a seasonal trend and the seasonal e↵ect is much more
amplified. This shows that football consumers are more likely to consume the
newest generation game titles and not interested in older generations of game
3
According to the email conversations I had with the website administrator, the quantity
for Americas is the quantity for the United States multiplied by ten ninth.
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Figure 1.3: Quantity Chart: mean weekly sales for all games and football games
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titles. Other sports games have similar features. Vehicle simulation games do
not have certain release dates. However, they do not su↵er from problems like a
spike in used good price right before the release of a new generation.
1.2.3 Product Characteristics
I collect product characteristics variables from multiple sources manually by my-
self. Some product characteristics are time-invariant. These variables will not
change after the game has been released. Others are time-variant. Some of the
observations of these variables will be used as game title quality measures. Some
will be used as instrumental variables. Some will be used as control variables. Due
to the data quality of each variable, certain variables are used more frequently
than others.
The time-invariant variables are the stable ones. They include game scores,
physical appearances of the gaming discs, game content ratings ,publishers and
developers for all games, cover stars for available games, and PC system require-
ments for games that are compatible with personal computers. Release dates for
each game title are obviously a part of my data set.
Game Scores
Many video gaming websites and publications have their own ratings for a large
number of games. Although these ratings are not identical across websites, they
are highly correlated. I include ratings from Gamespot.com (owned by CBS in-
teractive) and IGN entertainment. These are both leading platforms that release
information and reviews about video games. The structure of game reviews gen-
erally takes two forms – a professional game review and user reviews. While
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reviews, and especially user reviews, change over time during the lifetime of the
game. The early professional reviews change little after a game has been released.
Hence, these types of reviews can be treated as time-invariant quality di↵erences.
For example, on Gamespot.com, every game has a “Critic Score” and a “User
Score”. The former is rated by game critics and it becomes stable soon after
the game has been released. The latter is rated by users of the website, and it
is constantly updated since users submit their own scores at random times. On
IGN.com, every game has a “Press Score” and a “Reader Score”. They work
similarly as the two scores given by gamesopt.com. In this case, the “Critic
Score” and the “Press Score” can be treated as measures of the initial quality of
a game. The other two can be treated as measures of the up-to-date game qual-
ities, though data availability is much more limited for these kinds of reviews.
The corresponding variables I created in the data set are as follows:
• GSCritics: the “Press Score” from gamespot.com
• GSConsumers: the “User Score” from gamespot.com
• IGNPress: the “Press Score” from ign.com
• IGNReaders: the “Reader Score” from ign.com
Physical Appearances
Every game sold on Amazon.com will show the physical size of the game disc.
The size variables include the length, the width, and the height of the item.
Since the item will be shipped at the end, the weight is listed for each product
as well. All these variables are time-invariant. I am able to include the physical
appearance variables as follows:
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• length: the length of a game title disc, unit: inch
• width: the width of a game title disc, unit: inch
• height: the height of a game title disc, unit: inch
• weight: the weight of a game title disc, unit: ounce
Game Content Rating
Since games have di↵erent target consumers and di↵erent content, every game
sold in the United States is rated by the Entertainment Software Rating Board
(ESRB). The corresponding ESRB ratings of all games sold on Amazon.com are
available. For games that are released in Europe, Pan European Game Informa-
tion (PEGI) has another content rating for each game. This type of information
is publicly available as well. Both of these rating systems have di↵erent ratings
for di↵erent game titles, which means the same game for di↵erent consoles may
have di↵erent ESRB ratings or di↵erent PEGI ratings.
ESRB ratings have these ratings: EC (early childhood), E (everyone), E10+
(everyone 10 and older), T (teen), M (mature), AO (adults only), and RP (rating
pending). As explained by ESRB, EC means a game is suitable for ages 3 or older;
E means a game is suitable for ages 6 and older, E10+ means a title is for ages
10 or older; T means a title is for ages 13 or older; M is only for ages 17 or older;
AO is for ages 18 or older. If a game title receives an ESRB rating, the youngest
age permissible will be the value of the ESRB rating variable.
PEGI ratings include 3, 7,12, 16 and 18. These numbers stand for the youngest
age allowed to play each game. These numbers naturally become the observations
for the PEGI ratings. However, PEGI ratings have limited availability compared
to the ESRB ratings.
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The game content rating variables are as follows:
• ESRB: the value of the ESRB rating of each game title
• PEGI: the value of the PEGI rating of each game title
Publishers and Developers
A game title will have one or more developers, which are studios that are in
charge of making this game. In many cases, the developers will be studios that
are owned by the publisher of the game. In other cases, the development work can
be outsourced by the publisher to individual developers. The same game designed
for di↵erent platforms can be developed by one or more studios. The sequential
games can be developed by di↵erent developers as well. Sometimes, the publisher
of a game’s successor can be di↵erent from the publisher of its earlier generations.
It is reasonable to believe that the developers’ and publishers’ capabilities will
have significant influences on the game qualities. The identities of the developers
and the publishers of a certain game are public information.
Since the developer’s ability to develop game features does have e↵ects on
gaming experiences, my empirical investigation derives developer rankings in or-
der to create a measure of developer ability. “Game Developer” is a magazine
that specializes in the video game market. It ranks the top one hundred among
all video game studios every year. I was able to get the game developer rankings
for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. A measure of the developer is created as the
developer value for each game title using the corresponding developer’s ranking
in the year the game title was introduced.
The editors of “Game Developer” magazine formed Game Developer Research,
which publishes the game publishers’ annual ranking. The publishers’ rankings
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are developed using information from various aspects, such as total game sales,
publishers’ employee salaries, acknowledged experts at video games, and the final
end consumers etc. The top 20 video game publishers will be ranked every year.
This allows me to create a measure of the publisher of each game similar as the
developer values.
These two variables are as follows:
• developer: According to the developers’ ranking in the game release year,
the No. 1 ranked developer will be given 100, the No. 2 ranked developer
will be given 99, and so on. The unranked developers will be assigned 0 as
the developer value for a game.
• publisher: Similarly, if the game is published by the No. 1 publisher in
the game introduction year, the publisher value will be 20, and others will
decrease accordingly. If the publisher is not ranked in that year, a zero will
be used as the publisher value.
Cover Star
A lot of sports and vehicle games employ sports stars to do advertisements for
the game titles. It is quite normal to see that the same game will have di↵erent
stars for di↵erent console versions. The cover stars are normally di↵erent across
di↵erent generations. It is not at all common to see a star being chosen by a
game series constantly except for game series that are designed specifically for
one athlete. The cover stars are seen by the public and the econometrician at no
cost.
To construct a measure of the cover star, the popularity of this athlete in the
year when the game title is introduced has to play a dominant role. For di↵erent
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sports, popularity levels are measured by di↵erent standards. For NCAA sports,
whether the athlete makes it to the All-American team will be a good measure
of the cover star popularity. For sports like tennis and golf where a year-end
standing for all professionals is available, it is natural to use this ranking as a
measure. The salaries of all athletes reflect how much the players are appreciated.
Major awards one athlete wins in a year suggest the popularity of the player in
the respective year.4
PC Requirements
For games that are compatible with personal computers, the system requirements
are good indicators of how complicated or sophisticated a game is. If a game has
PC requirements, it will be constant across di↵erent platforms. Since a PC game
will have two groups of system requirements, the minimum system requirements
and suggested system requirements, both groups are included. The variables I
developed for system requirements are as follows:
• min prcsr: the minimum standard for the processor; unit: GHz
• min memo: the minimum standard for the memory space; unit: GB
• min hard: the minimum standard for the hard drive; unit: GB
• min video: the minimum standard for the video card; unit: MB
• rcmd prcsr: the recommended standard for the processor; unit: GHz
• rcmd memo: the recommended standard for the memory space; unit: GB
• rcmd hard: the recommended standard for the hard drive; unit: GB
4
A detailed explanation of how this variable is created can be found in the Appendix.
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• rcmd video: the recommended standard for the video card; unit: MB
The only time-variant variable I have in this investigation for each game title
is the number of compatible platforms (compatibility). Since a certain game
generation will not necessarily release all game titles for all consoles at the same
time, the number of compatible platforms can change. This variable will increase
when the same game is released for another console.
1.2.4 Conclusions
The video game market has been a fast growing industry in the last few decades.
However, the research that is focused on this industry has not been as popu-
lar. I will further explore this industry in the later part of my dissertation. As
mentioned before, video game producers constantly introduce new generations
of video games to the market. Chapter 2 of my dissertation investigates such
behavior by the video game producers. A theoretical model is developed to in-
vestigate the relationship between producer’s choices related to new generation
releases and the activities in the second hand market. A simple reduced form
regression will be used to test the main hypothesis from the theoretical model as
well.
Due to the uniqueness and richness of my data set, I am able to do a wide range
of empirical tests and applications in the video game market. The third chapter
of my dissertation employs this data set to show a potential improvement of the
traditional di↵erentiated product models. The results show that the inclusion of
rental prices instead of retail prices in di↵erentiated product models are critical. I
am able to obtain more accurate and reasonable empirical estimates by including
both the new good retail price and the future resale price for each game title. I
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do not use all variables that are complied in the data set. This leaves room for
more empirical investigation ideas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Competing with your own
products:
Endogenous planned
obsolescence behavior in the
video game industry
2.1 Introduction
Durable goods producers often release new generations of their products in a
relatively frequent manner. It is well known that automobile manufacturers reg-
ularly introduce new versions of their models, and so do producers in many other
industries. Textbook publishers upgrade versions of their books through the in-
troduction of new editions and cell phone manufacturers are continually bringing
to market new products with new features. A key aspect of these types of durable
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markets is that the durable goods producer faces potential competition from its
existing stock of used goods. This raises a number of issues in modeling the be-
havior of durable goods producers including the role of planned obsolescence and
the timing of new model introductions. In this chapter, I focus on the former
issue and examine how quality upgrading by a durable goods producer a↵ects
pricing in the second-hand market.
This chapter develops a model that incorporates dynamic pricing and quality
upgrading decisions in a durable-goods monopoly setting and then tests predic-
tions of that model using data from the video-game market. The video-game
industry is a nice setting in that the product is generally quite durable, there is
a well-developed second-hand market for games, and software producers upgrade
specific game titles over time. Most video game producers release new genera-
tions of their products often, especially for the popular and successful games. For
instance, one of the major sports game producer, EA sports, releases a Madden
NFL game at the beginning of each football season. This is common in the indus-
try and allows me to focus on a set of games where the timing of the game release
will not generally be a strategic consideration. Moreover, by using information
on publicly available game reviews, proxy measures of quality improvements can
be constructed.
My theoretical strategy is to build a two-period model with heterogeneous
consumers that have di↵erent preferences over product features and prices. In
the video game market, I observe that there are some consumers who buy a
game immediately after the game is released in the market. Other consumers
may choose to wait and purchase in the used good market. The di↵erent choices
made by these consumers result from consumer heterogeneity, as well as the
menu of products available to consumers in the new- and used-goods markets. If
25
a consumer places great weight on having the most up-to-date and sophisticated
version of a game series, she will likely choose the newest generation of this game.
This is because manufacturers generally expand and improve product features in
their latest o↵erings. This behavior by durable-goods producers is a form of
planned obsolescence, decreasing the value of used products.
A good example that illustrates this incentive is the introduction of textbook
editions. Textbook publishers make minor changes to their existing textbook
edition, mainly by adding real time tables and new examples into their latest
edition. Bond and Iizuka (2004) show the competition from the used book market
indeed lowers the price of new books. This result is consistent with the findings
of Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009). If a firm wants to reduce the competition from
the secondary market, it has to make the new generation of their products more
appealing. The firm can improve the quality of the new generation or lower the
price of the new generation, or do both. However, quality improvements require
investments in R&D spending. Higher R&D costs will restrict the firm’s ability
to lower the price of its products.
In this chapter, a two-period model is developed in order to investigate a
monopolist’s equilibrium choice of quality improvement and product price. The
impact on the secondary market is shown as well. Both consumers and the firm
are assumed to be forward looking. The model shows that a firm with lower
R&D costs will increase quality improvements, resulting in lower resale price of
the older-generation products. The model shows that a more R&D e cient firm
will bring to market higher quality goods in the second period, allowing the firm
higher prices and margins of the new good in the second period and lowering the
price in the second-hand market.
The main empirical test is to examine whether an inverse relationship between
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quality improvement in the new generation good and prices in the used-good mar-
ket exists. As mentioned above, my analysis looks at data from the video game
industry. This industry has been growing very quickly over the past 30 years.
My focus is on games that have regularly updated new generations including
sports games and vehicle simulation games. As introduced in Chapter 1, Data
on new good prices and quantities sold are collected, along with price data for
each game title from the used good market. A number of di↵erent sources pro-
vide information on game reviews and compatibility levels, my main gauge of
product quality improvement, and data on game characteristics are constructed.
The key finding is that used video game prices are increasing in new generation
video games prices and decreasing in compatibility levels. However, the game
rating di↵erences do not seem to follow the pattern my theory indicates. My
results support the idea that the used good prices are endogenously decided by
the firm’s choices concerning the next generation products.
The main structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides a litera-
ture review on planned obsolescence and quality improvement of durable goods.
Section 3 of this chapter introduces the two-period model and its implications.
The section after the model consists of an empirical test that is employed to show
the main prediction of the theoretical model. Section 5 shows future extensions
and conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature on planned obsolescence and durable goods recognizes
that producers of a durable good choose durability as a fundamental character-
istic of the product. Swan (1970, 1971) shows that a producer of a durable good
27
will design their products with the socially optimal durability level, so the quality
of the products are not artificially lowered by the manufacturers. Swan’s results
were shown to be quite sensitive to assumptions about cost structures and substi-
tutability between new and used goods. Indeed, Rust (1986) derives the opposite
result by changing a basic assumption in Swan (1970)’s work. Rust assumes the
lifetime distribution of a durable good is endogenous. His main conclusion is that
a monopolist firm has an incentive to kill o↵ the secondary market by introducing
products with short durability, basically incorporating the idea of “planned ob-
solescence”. Waldman (1996) continues this line of inquiry but assumes that new
and used goods are not perfect substitutes. In this paper, the model shows that
competition from the secondary market lowers the firm’s total profit and the firm
has an incentive to produce less durable goods in order to reduce competition
from the used good market.
The time inconsistency problem faced by a durable good monopolist is the
driving force behind the model in Bulow (1982). When the game is set up with a
finite number of stages, the monopolist will always over-supply in the last period.
Bulow develops a model to show that a monopolist producer will always have a
strong incentive to make the durability of the product shorter when consumers
are forward-looking and renting is not feasible. Later, both Waldman (1993)
and Choi (1994) develop multi-stage models to investigate planned obsolescence.
Waldman (1993) compares the circumstances where the monopolist can or can-
not commit to second period production. The monopolist who cannot commit
to second period production levels always lowers the price and produces more in
the second period in order to make a higher profit. In so doing, the monopolist
will lower the total social surplus while lowering its own profit in the mean time
compared to the commitment case. In Choi (1994), the monopolist’s choice of
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compatibility is considered instead of the choice of product type. The model
shows that the monopolist seller will choose to make the second period product
incompatible with the first period product. Although o↵ering full compatibility
is the socially optimal choice, it will not be achieved. Bond and Iizkua (2004)
develop a similar model to describe behavior in the textbook market. They show
that textbook producers are more likely to introduce a new textbook edition,
decreasing the value of the old edition, when the competition from the used book
market grows too strong. An empirical application by Chevalier and Goolsbee
(2005) looked at the textbook market and showed that durable good consumers
are indeed forward looking, suggesting that the time inconsistency problem, and
hence planned obsolescence, may be an important feature of durable goods mar-
kets.
Most of the papers discussed above deal with the introduction of a new prod-
uct by assuming the firm is able to put out a new generation of goods without
any di culties. Waldman (1996) introduces endogenous R&D decision-making
into a durable goods model using a two period game. In the first period, the
firm faces a problem of deciding the level of R&D investment to undertake in
order to improve the quality of the goods in the second period. The model shows
that the monopolist firm will have an incentive to over-improve the quality of
the second period product. The social welfare level increases as long as the firm
in crease the quality in the second period but will not be maximized from a
social planner’s standpoint. This conclusion follows the main ideas in the pre-
vious work on planned obsolescence. By including endogenous R&D decisions
into the firm’s profit maximizing function, the firm still engages in planned ob-
solescence. Dhebar(1994) develops a model to investigate product improvement
where the consumer population is distributed continuously. The firm chooses
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both the quality and the price of its products each period in the model. Due
to the time-inconsistency problem discussed above, when consumers expect the
product to improve in present-value terms, the subgame-perfect equilibrium does
not exist.
The existing literature on planned obsolescence provides some interesting re-
sults regarding a durable good monopolist’s equilibrium behavior. When new
products and old products are not perfect substitutes, the monopolist producer
will engage in planned obsolescence. If the consumers are forward-looking, the
monopolist producer of durable goods will face a time inconsistency problem.
A durable goods monopolist has a strong incentive to kill o↵ the second-hand
market by introducing new good features or incompatibility; forms of planned
obsolescence. However, while other papers on planned obsolescence adopt dis-
cretely distributed consumers, Dhebar(1994) assumes continuously distributed
consumers but fails to derive a subgame-perfect equilibrium due to the lack of
an active second-hand market. Kornish (2001) changes the model introduced by
Dhebar (1994) by assuming away the special upgrade o↵er provided by the firm.
Although Kornish (2001) proves the subgame-perfect equilibrium exist, her model
also does not include a second-hand market. While a rming the important role
of the second-hand market, none of authors attempt to intensively analyze the
impact on the second-hand market activities.
It is clear that the second hand market activities will be a↵ected by product
innovation strategies. However, it is not quite clear how large this impact is. This
chapter shows the e↵ect of quality improvement on second-hand market activities
from both theoretical and empirical stand points.
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2.3 A Two-Period Model
This model follows Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001). I assume only one set
of consumers exist in both periods. If consumers are only allowed to buy new
products in each period, the model results are relatively clean. In my approach,
the same set of consumers exist in both periods but they are now allowed to
buy and sell in a used good market in the second period. My model shows that




The product of interest is a durable good that does not su↵er any physical wear
and tear. A monopolist producer is the only producer of this product. This firm
chooses prices and qualities of its products in two periods and only produce and
sell the most up-to-date products in each period. The quality of the products is
measured on a cardinal scale. In the first period, the firm announces the quality
of their product version 1, q1, and the price of version 1, p1. In the second period,
the firm announces their choices of product quality for version 2, q2, and price,
p2. The products with q1 quality are not produced any more. After the quality
levels of the products are announced, the firm need to pay zero marginal cost to
produce the products.
The Consumers
I assume that in each period, a consumer can observe the price and quality of
the products at zero cost. The same set of consumers exist in both periods of the
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game. Consumer hetergeneity is represented by an index number between 0 and
1. All consumer indexes are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].
In the first period, consumers decide whether they want to purchase a unit
of product version 1 given the quality level q1 and price level p1. In the second
period, the firm announces its choices of q2 and p2. A consumer who owns a unit
of version 1 can choose whether to sell the product in the used good market. If
she wants to buy the new product in the second period, she will sell the used
good she owns and purchase a unit of product version 2. If she chooses not to
participate in the second-hand market, she holds the good she purchased before
in the second period. She is also allowed to sell her version 1 product without
purchasing the new generation. For a consumer who did not purchase in the
first period, she can choose among three options: no purchase, purchase in the
second-hand market, and purchase a new product version 2.
For a consumer with consumer index x, the present value of the benefits that
she derives if the product has quality q as follows:
W (q, x) = f(q)g(x), (2.1)
where both f(·) and g(·) are monotonically increasing functions.Consumers share
the same discount factor as the firm. The discount factor is indicated by   2
(0, 1). In the first period, a consumer makes the consumption choice based on
the expectation of the second period firm decisions. In the second period, all first
period firm decisions and consumption choices are given, and consumers decide
whether they want to participate in the second-hand market or the new good
market. I assume that the agents in the model have rational expectations. With
this assumption, I will not need to include the expectation symbol when I write
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down the utility function of each consumer at the beginning of the first period. A
consumer with consumer index x will be able to obtain Vij(x) as her utility if she
owns product version i at the end of the first period and owns product version j
at the end of the second period. i = 0 or j = 0 indicates the outside option.
To summarize the consumers’ consumption choices, they have six choices over
two periods. If they stay out of the market and never purchase in either period,
their utility function will be:
V00 = 0. (2.2)
Consumers may choose only to purchase a unit of used product in the second
period. Their utility will be:
V01 = 0 +  [f(q1)g(x)  s2]
=  [f(q1)g(x)  s2],
(2.3)
where s2 is the used good price. Consumers who only purchase a unit of new
product version 2 in period 2 will have utility as follows:
V02 = 0 +  [f(q2)g(x)  p2]
=  [f(q2)g(x)  p2].
(2.4)
For consumers who decide to purchase in the first period, they are allowed to sell
the used good and do not buy any products in the second period. If this is the
actual consumption choice, the utility will be:
V10 = [f(q1)g(x)  p1] +  s2
= f(q1)g(x)  (p1    s2).
(2.5)
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If a first period buyer decides to keep the used product in the second period, she
will obtain a utility level as follows:
V11 = [f(q1)g(x)  p1] +  f(q1)g(x)
= (1 +  )f(q1)g(x)  p1.
(2.6)
If a consumer decides to sell her used product in the second period and purchase
a unit of product version 2, her utility function will be:
V12 = [f(q1)g(x)  p1] +  [f(q2)g(x)  p2 + s2]
= [f(q1) +  f(q2)]g(x)  [p1 +  (p2  s2)].
(2.7)
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, a consumer with index x will choose the
consumption choice that generates the highest utility among all V functions in
the first period and accordingly in the second period. This is due to both rational
expectations and firms not deviating from the equilibrium strategies. s2 is the
market clearing price in the used good market in the second period. p’s and q’s
are the monopolist producer’s equilibrium choices. Since the quality improvement
is restricted to be non-negative, s2 has to be smaller than p2 since no buyers will
be willing to purchase a used product version 1 if s2   p2.
The Producer
The producer chooses p1 and q1 at the beginning of the first period. At the
beginning of the second period, everything happened in the first period is given.
The firm chooses p2 and q2 in order to maximize the second period profit. Since
the firm does not benefit from the transactions in the second-hand market, the
producer has an incentive to introduce a high q2 so that it can make its product
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version 2 more attractive to the consumers. However, I assume that the firm has
to pay a fixed cost in order to develop a certain level of quality in the first period
and some fixed cost again in the second period in order to develop a given level
of quality improvement. The size of the fixed cost takes a quadratic form so that
the marginal cost of developing quality is increasing. For the firm, the second
period profit function will be:
⇧2 = p2 ·Q2(p2, q2)  ↵2(q2   q1)2, (2.8)
where ↵2 indicates the fixed cost parameter and Q2 is the quantity of product
version 2 sold in the second period. Since the firm’s choices of p2 and q2 are made
based on the realizations of p1 and q1, the second period profit is eventually a
function of the first period firm choice variables.
In the first period, the firm has to develop a certain level of quality. They
pay a fixed cost to do the R&D. The firm’s first period profit is as follows:
⇧1 = p1 ·Q1(p1, q1)  ↵1q21, (2.9)
where ↵1 is the fixed cost parameter for the first period and Q1 is the quantity of
product version 1 sold in the first period. I assume that the monopolist producer
shares the same discount factor,  , as the consumers. By combining the two
periods’ profits, I can derive the firm’s total profit function as follows:
⇧ = ⇧1 +  ⇧2 = p1 ·Q1 +  p2 ·Q2   ↵1q21   ↵2 (q2   q1)2. (2.10)
This is a function of p1 and q1. This shows that the firm chooses the quality level
and price level in the first period in order to maximize the total profit over two
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periods. After the first period firm strategies are revealed, the firm announces
the second period strategies as planned and the consumers behave accordingly
to the firm’s choices. The main results of the model show that the monopolist
producer will develop di↵erent pricing and quality choices in the second period
for di↵erent exogenous variables.
2.3.2 Backward Induction and Candidates for Equilibria
Assume that the present value function takes a simple functional form:
W (q, x) = qx, (2.11)
This will simplify the value functions significantly.
V00 = 0. (2.12)
V01 =  q1x   s2. (2.13)
V02 =  q2x   p2. (2.14)
V10 = q1x  (p1    s2). (2.15)
V11 = (1 +  )q1x  p1. (2.16)
V12 = (q1 +  q2)x  [p1 +  (p2   s2)]. (2.17)
The index orders consumers according to how much they care about quality.
I can prove that in the first period, the consumers who purchase will have higher
indexes than the consumers who do not purchase.
Lemma 2.1. If a consumer with consumer index x⇤ 2 [0, 1] purchases in the first
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period, all consumers with consumer indexes greater than x⇤ will be purchasing
in the first period.
Proof. I just need to show that there is a unique cut-o↵ point in the first period.
I can solve the equation:
V10(x) = V00(x).






8x > x1, V10(x) > V00(x); 8x < x1, V10(x) < V00(x). (2.18)




8x > x1, V11(x) > V01(x); 8x < x1, V11(x) < V01(x). (2.19)
8x > x1, V12(x) > V02(x); 8x < x1, V12(x) < V02(x). (2.20)
If I combine (2.18), (2.19), and (2.20), I find that
8x > x1,max{V10, V11, V12} > max{V00, V01, V02};
8x < x1,max{V10, V11, V12} < max{V00, V01, V02}.
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This shows that x1 is the unique cut-o↵ point that divides all consumers into two
groups: the buyers and non-buyers in the first period.
In order to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, backward induction will
be employed to solve the model. At the beginning of the second period, the firm
announces the price and quality of its product version 2. Consumers who have a
unit of used good will consider whether they want to participate in the used good
market and whether they want to purchase a unit of the new product. Consumers
who have not purchased yet will need to consider whether they will buy a unit
of the used product version 1 or buy a unit of the new product version 2 or stay
out of the market. Assume the lowest consumer index of the ones who purchase
in the first period is x1 2 [0, 1]. Lemma 1 shows that this x1 exists and it is
unique. Furthermore, the value of x1 will be (p1   s2)/q1 if (p1   s2)/q1 2 [0, 1].
8x   x1, the consumer with index x will purchase in the first period. 8x < x1,
the consumer with index x will not purchase in the second period.
After the firm announces p2 and q2 at the beginning of the second period, for
consumers with index x > x1, they need to consider their second period utility.
They can either sell their product and stay out of the market in order to obtain
U10(x), or keep their used first period good and obtain U11(x) as the second
period utility level, or sell the used good and purchase a new product version 2
and obtain U12(x) as the second period utility level, I can derive the functional
forms for U10, U11, and U12 as follows:
U10 = s2 (2.21)
U11 = q1x (2.22)
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U12 = q2x+ s2   p2 (2.23)
I have to compare the values of these three second period utility functions in
order to obtain the second period choices made by these consumers.
U10(x) > U11(x), 8x <
s2
q1




U10(x) > U12(x), 8x <
p2
q2




U11(x) > U12(x), 8x <
p2   s2
q2   q1




For consumers who did not purchase in the first period, they have three op-
tions in the second period as well. They obtain U00(x) utility if they stay out of
the market. They will have U01(x) as their utility level for the second period if
they purchase a used product version 1. They will obtain U02(x) as their second
period utility level if they purchase a new product version 2. I can write down
the functional forms for these utility functions:
U00 = 0 (2.27)
U01 = q1x  s2 (2.28)
U02 = q2x  p2 (2.29)
Simply, I can derive that
U00(x) > U01(x), 8x <
s2
q1




U00(x) > U02(x), 8x <
p2
q2





U01(x) > U02(x), 8x <
p2   s2
q2   q1




When s2/q1 > p2/q2, I have s2/q1 > p2/q2 > (p2   s2)/(q2   q1) > 0; when
s2/q1 < p2/q2, I have 0 < (p2   s2)/(q2   q1) < s2/q1 < p2/q2. I can show that
both s2/q1 and p2/q2 are less than 1 if the firm maximizes their second period
utility.
Lemma 2.2. In the second period, the monopolist’s equilibrium strategy will gen-
erate p2/q2 < 1 and s2/q1 < 1.
Proof. If p2/q2 > 1, according to Eq (2.25), U12 will be dominated by U10 for all
consumers. According to Eq (2.31), U02 will be dominated by U00. If none of
the consumers have either U02 or U12 as their highest possible utility level in the
second period, the monopolist will have zero sales in the second period. However,
the monopolist will never have zero sales in the second period at subgame perfect
equilibrium. At the beginning of the second period, all first period strategies
have been revealed. As long as the firm keeps the quality level fixed and charges
a su ciently low price, it has positive sales.
If s2/q1 > 1, according to Eq (2.24) and Eq(2.30), U11 and U01 will be both
dominated. When U11 is dominated, consumers who have purchased in the first
period will not want to hold on to their used products in the second period.
Instead, these consumers will want to supply their products in the used good
market. When U01 is dominated, consumers who did not purchase in the first
period will not purchase in the used good market. In this case, the demand for
the used good is zero. This will not be an equilibrium outcome in the used good
market, as s2 will be driven down by the secondary market activities.
Since I am not able to figure out the comparison between s2/q1 and p2/q2 at
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this point, I will have to analyze all possible cases in order to find out candidates
for subgame perfect equilibrium. I have three cases: s2q1 <
p2
q2





< s2q1  1, and
s2
q1
< p2q2 < 1 <
p2 s2
q2 q1 . I next consider possible scenarios
for subgame perfect equilibria.
2.3.3 Case I: p2 s2q2 q1 <
p2
q2
< s2q1  1
I only need to know the location of x1 in order to figure out which consumers
are making each specific consumption choice. In this case, I have four possible
intervals between 0 and 1 that may contain x1, the cuto↵ point in the first
period. Since the supply in the secondary market is always positive and the
demand for used good is zero, I am able to show that Case I will not be a
candidate for subgame perfect equilibrium. Detailed explanations are included
in the Appendix.
2.3.4 Case II: s2q1 <
p2
q2
< 1 < p2 s2q2 q1
The same idea applies to Case II. I have to locate the indi↵erent consumer with
x1 consumer index in the first period. In this case, x1 can only show up in
three di↵erent intervals since x1 cannot be greater than 1. Case II cannot be a
subgame perfect equilibrium for the same reason as Case I: the used good supply
is positive, and the demand for the used products is zero. Detailed derivations
are included in the Appendix as well.
2.3.5 Case III: s2q1 <
p2
q2
< p2 s2q2 q1 < 1
There are four possible intervals that x1 may belong to. In the following part of
this subsection, I will analyze di↵erent cases in which x1 belongs to each of the
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four intervals and show possible subgame perfect equilibrium results.






In this case, any consumers who do not purchase in the first period will still stay
out of the market in the second period. Consumers who purchase in the first
period will sell their used product and not buy again if their consumer index
is smaller than s2q1 . Consumers keep their purchase if their consumer index is
between s2q1 and
p2 s2
q2 q1 . For consumers with indexes greater than
p2 s2
q2 q1 , they will
sell their first period purchase and buy a new product version 2.
8x  x1, U00 > max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 (x1,
s2
q1






], U11   max{U10, U12}; 8x 2 (
p2   s2
q2   q1
, 1], U12 > max{U10, U11}.
As in Case I, the used good supply is positive and there is no used good demand,
so there is no subgame perfect equilibrium.
Case III-II: s2q1  x1 <
p2
q2
< p2 s2q2 q1 < 1
For consumers whose consumer indexes are smaller than s2q1 , they will not purchase
in either period 1 or period 2. For consumers with indexes between s2q1 and x1,
they will choose to purchase a unit of used product version 1 in the second period.
For consumers whose indexes are between x1 and
p2 s2
q2 q1 , they will purchase in the
first period and keep their product in the second period. for consumers with
relatively high indexes, higher than p2 s2q2 q1 , they will purchase in the first period
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and supply their products in the used good market in the second period.
8x 2 [0, s2
q1
], U00 > max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 [
s2
q1




], U11   max{U10, U12}; 8x 2 (
p2   s2
q2   q1
, 1], U12   max{U10, U11}.
So the used good supply is
Su = 1  p2   s2
q2   q1
, (2.33)
and the used good demand is




I will be able to derive the equilibrium market clearing used good price by equal-
izing the supply and demand of the used products.






Case III-II is a candidate for a subgame perfect equilibrium. Consumers’ con-
sumption choices will be illustrated in Figure 2.1 in this case. Figure 2.1 shows
that consumers with highest consumer indexes will choose to purchase in both
period since they have the highest utility levels generated from purchases. Con-
sumers with indexes not as high will choose to purchase in the first period and
then keep their purchases in the second period. Consumers with relatively lower
indexes will only choose to purchase a unit of used product in the second period.
Consumers with the lowest indexes will never purchase.
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Figure 2.1: Consumption Choices for All Consumers for Case III-II
Case III-III: s2q1 <
p2
q2
 x1 < p2 s2q2 q1 < 1
If a consumer does not purchase in the first period, she will still stay out of the
market if her index is smaller than s2q1 ; she will only purchase a unit of used good
if her index is between s2q1 and
p2
q2
or her index is between p2q2 and x1. For consumers
who have purchased in the first period, she will keep the used product version 1
if her index is between x1 and
p2 s2
q2 q1 and she will sell the used good and buy a
new product version 2 if her index is greater than p2 s2q2 q1 .
8x 2 [0, s2
q1
], U00 > max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 [
s2
q1




], U11   max{U10, U12}; 8x 2 (
p2   s2
q2   q1
, 1], U12   max{U10, U11}.
The derivation of the market clearing used good price is eventually the same
situation as in Case III-II. I will be equalizing Eq (2.33) and Eq (2.34) to find
used good price. All consumers’ respective consumption choices will be illustrated
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Figure 2.2: Consumption Choices for All Consumers for Case III-III
by Figure 2.2.
Case III-IV: s2q1 <
p2
q2
< p2 s2q2 q1  x1 < 1
If a consumer does not purchase in the first period, she will stay out of the market
in the second period if her consumer index is smaller than s2q1 , she will purchase
a unit of used good if her index is between s2q1 and
p2 s2
q2 q1 , and she will purchase
a unit of new product version 2 if her index is between p2 s2q2 q1 and x1. For all
consumers who have purchased in the first period, their second period choice will
be selling in the used good market and buying a new product version 2.
8x 2 [0, s2
q1






], U01   max{U00, U02};
8x 2 (p2   s2
q2   q1
, x1], U02   max{U00, U01}; 8x 2 (x1, 1], U12   max{U10, U11}.
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Figure 2.3: Consumption Choices for All Consumers for Case III-IV
In this case, the used good supply is
Su = 1  x1, (2.36)







I will need to equalize the supply and demand in the secondary market in order





= 1  x1. (2.38)
It is straightforward to see that Eq(2.38) is equivalent as Eq(2.35). In this case,
consumers with the highest consumer indexes will choose to purchase a unit of
new product in both periods and sell their used product in the second period.
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Consumers with indexes relatively high will only purchase a unit of new product
in the second period. Consumers with lower indexes will only purchase the used
products in the second period. Consumers with the lowest indexes will never
purchase any products. In Case III-IV, the consumers’ consumption choices are
illustrated in Figure 2.3.
2.3.6 Solving for Equilibrium
I will use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium results of the model.
Thus, I will first solve for the equilibrium choices for the monopolist producer in
the second period treating first period variables as given.
Solving for the Second Period
In the second period, the firm makes choices of p2 and q2 in an attempt to
maximize the second period profit. However, unlike in the first period, it now
faces competition from the used good market. The buyers in the first period
become potential sellers of the used good and their decision to participate in the
used good market raises competition against the monopolist producer’s products.
Both the firm’s pricing choice and quality improvement will a↵ect the second-
hand market activities.
When the subgame perfect equilibrium is contained in Case III-II or Case
III-III, the used good market supply and demand curves are described by Eq
(2.33) and Eq (2.34). When the firm wants to reduce the secondary market
activity in order to kill o↵ the competition from the used products, it can either
shift the supply curve or shift the demand curve. According to Eq (2.34), the
demand curve does not directly contain any firm choice variables so changing
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either the new good price or the new good quality in the second period will not
shift the demand curve directly. If the firm wants to make the second period new
good more competitive, it can either lower the new good price, p2, or develop a
larger quality improvement, q2  q1. When the firm lower p2 and keep the quality
improvement constant, the supply curve is shifted to the right and the resale price
of the used good is lowered. When the firm increases the quality improvement
and keep p2 constant, the supply is shifted to the right as well. Thus the resale
price of the used good drops.
When Case III-IV contains the subgame perfect equilibrium, Eq (2.36) and Eq
(2.37) will be the corresponding supply and demand functions in the secondary
market. The supply curve does not directly involve the monopoly firm’s choices.
The demand curve will be lowered if the firm lowers the new good price or enlarges
the quality improvement. If the monopolist producer chooses either one of these
two ways to reduce the demand in the secondary market, the used good price
and used good quantity will both decrease.
I see that the firm can adopt a higher quality improvement or a lower new
good price in order to make the resale value of the used good price low. However,
the resale value is one of the factors that consumers consider when they decide
whether to purchase in the first period. If consumers expect a low resale value
of the first period products, fewer consumers will be willing to purchase the first
period good. In this case, the firm will need to choose an appropriate optimization
strategy so that it reduces the resale value of the used good by a proper amount.
The secondary market clearing price can be solved by applying either Eq




[p2 + (x1   1)(q2   q1)]. (2.39)
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The used good price is a function of the second period firm choice variables and
the first period cut-o↵ point, which I treat as given in the second period.
Eq(2.8) shows the firm’s profit in the second period. I only have to calculate
the quantity of new product version 2 sold in the second period. In Case III-II





In Case III-IV, the new good sales in the second period is
Q2 = (1  x1) + (x1  
p2   s2
q2   q1
) = 1  p2   s2
q2   q1
. (2.41)
Since Eq(2.40) and Eq(2.41) are identical equations, I am able to get the func-
tional form of the second period firm profit.




)  ↵2(q2   q1)2.
(2.42)
I am able to write p2 and q2 as functions of the first period variables and the
















  2↵2(q2   q1) = 0. (2.44)
The constraints of this profit optimization problem are: p2   0 and q2   q1.
It is obvious that a firm has no incentive to set a negative price since that will
not generate positive revenues. Due to the quadratic form of the fixed cost
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function, q2 will not be lower than q1. These simple facts guarantee that the
second period firm strategies will be the solution of Eq (2.43) and Eq (2.44) and
neither constraint will be binding.
Solve for the First Period









   q2 [p2   (q2   q1)]
1 +  q2 (q2   q1)
. (2.46)
I can write s2 as a function of firm choice variables as well.
s2 =
q1p2 + (q2   q1)(p1   q1)
q2 +  (q2   q1)
. (2.47)
Since x1 is the cut-o↵ point in the first period, I am able to calculate the quantity
of new good sold by the producer in the first period.
Q1 = 1  x1. (2.48)







)  ↵1q21   ↵2 (q2   q1)2. (2.49)
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Since I have p2, q2, and s2 as functions of p1 and q1, Eq(2.49) is a function with
only two endogenous variables: p1 and q1. I will be able to solve out these two
variables by adopting the F.O.C.s of Eq(2.49). The constraints of this total profit
maximization are: p1   0 and q1   0. It is simple to show that the these two
constraints will not be binding.
As I can tell from the F.O.C.s of the second period profit function, solving
for analytical solutions is di cult due to complicated functional forms of s2, p2,
and q2. However, I am able to use calibrations to show the subgame perfect
equilibrium of this model.
2.3.7 Simulation and Results
Simulations
There are three exogenous variables in this model; they are the discount factor,
 , and the fixed cost parameters, ↵1 and ↵2. I need to solve for the subgame
perfect equilibrium result for any given set of exogenous variable values.
After the exogenous variables are evaluated, I am able to write out four func-
tions where I have x1, p2, q2, and s2 as unknowns for a given set of p1 and q1
values. These four functions are Eq(2.45), Eq(2.43), Eq(2.44), and Eq(2.39). In
this equation system, I have four variables, three exogenous variables,  , ↵1, and
↵2, and two given values, p1 and q1. I will be able to solve for the four unknowns
by using computer programs.
After the four unknowns are solved for each possible set of p1 and q1, I am
able to calculate the total profit for the firm by using Eq(2.49). In this case, for
any given set of p1 and q1, the computer program will be able to calculate the
corresponding total profit and decide what first period firm choice variable values
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are maximizing the monopolist’s total profit.
However, it is not guaranteed that I will be able to obtain subgame perfect
equilibrium results for any exogenous variable values. It is also not guaranteed
that for a set of p1 and q1 values, the solution to the equation system is rational. I
will have to drop solutions where some rational constraints are violated or where
the unknown variable values violate the possible cases I discussed above.
The constraints I have here are as follows. They are either rational constraints
that make sure the results make sense or constraints that are generated from
previous steps.
• First period cut-o↵ point has to be between 0 and 1: 0  x1  1.
• Second period price must be strictly positive: p2 > 0.
• Second period quality cannot be lower than the first period quality: q2   q1.
• The used good price has to be lower than the new good price but still
none-negative: 0  s2 < p2.
• Case III-II, Case III-III, and Case III-IV all require: s2/q1 < p2/q2 <
(p2   s2)/(q2   q1) < 1.
I will need to check whether the solution to the equation system satisfies all
the constraints. If they do, the profit maximizing bundle, (p1, q1), will be the
firm’s equilibrium strategy in the first period for a given evaluation of exogenous
variables. The firm’s equilibrium strategy in the second period will be calculated
accordingly, as will the consumers’ choices.
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Figure 2.4: Profit Plot: ↵ = 0.4,  = 0.6
Results and Discussion
I obtain the simulation results for my theoretical model by checking the total
profits generated by a set of (p1, q1) values. The range for both p1 and q1 is
[0, 1] and is divided up into 500 increments of equal size. The results show that
the ranges chosen for these two variables are large enough to include equilibrium
choices for these two variables. For the case where ↵1 = 0.4, ↵2 = 0.4, and   = 0.6,
Figure 2.4 shows the profit function with p1 and q1 as variables. Although I am
not able to write out the analytical form of the profit function, Figure 2.4 shows
that the total profit is a well behaving function and is maximized at only one set
of values for p1 and q1. On Figure 2.4, the profit function does not cover the entire
area. This is because some values p1 and q1 generate other variable values that
do not satisfy rational constraints. On Figure 2.4, (p1, q1) = (0.362, 0.39) is the
maximizer of the profit function. The maximized profit gained in two periods for
the monopolist producer is 0.081017. I can calculate other endogenous variables
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Figure 2.5: value functions: ↵ = 0.4,  = 0.6
accordingly and find out the firm’s equilibrium strategies as well as consumer
consumption choices.
Figure 2.5 contains the value functions, V00, V01, V02, V10, V11, and V12, for
the same exogenous variable values. Figure 5 only shows the value functions for
consumers with indexes within the interval [0.64, 0.72]1. Since all value functions
are straight lines, for consumers whose indexes are higher and outside the range,
the black solid line will be the highest. For consumers whose indexes are lower
and outside the figure, the highest line is the solid yellow line or the solid blue
line. Consumers with the highest consumer indexes, where the solid black line is
the highest, will consume new goods in both periods. These consumers are the
suppliers of the used good in the secondary market. Consumers with relatively
higher consumer indexes, where the solid green line is the highest, will consume
1
I show all value functions for this range of consumer indexes because the green line is the
highest only on a short interval and it will not be visible if I show the entire [0, 1] interval.
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in the first period and keep the used good in the second period. Consumers
with relatively lower consumer indexes, where the solid blue line is the highest,
will only consume used goods in the second period. These consumers are the
demanders of the used products. The population of consumers who will choose
V01 and the population of consumers who will choose V12 are identical, and they
are both the size of the used good market in the second period of the game. In
the case shown in Fig 2.5, consumers who purchase new products in the second
period all sell their purchases from the first period. These consumers occupy a
dominant portion among the buyers from the first period. This illustrates that
the secondary market size is considerable. Consumers with the lowest consumer
indexes, where the solid yellow line is the highest, will stay out of the market in
both periods. Dashed lines are never the highest for any consumers. Therefore,
the corresponding consumption choices are never selected.
Table 2.1 includes simulation results I obtained for di↵erent exogenous vari-
able values around (↵1,↵2,  ) = (0.4, 0.4, 0.6). I intend to show the di↵erent
results for di↵erent second period fixed cost parameter given both ↵1 and   be-
ing constants. The main reason of doing so is because I want to investigate the
monopolist behavior when its ability to develop a certain product from scratch
is fixed but the ability of developing new features based on a already developed
product is di↵erent. In the top part of the table, discount factor   is a constant
with value 0.6 and the first period fixed cost parameter is fixed at 0.4. As the
second fixed cost parameter increases, it becomes more and more di cult for
the monopolist to develop higher quality improvements, the total profit of the
firm decreases, as well as the second period quality. However, the firm that faces
a higher fixed cost parameter in the second period will develop its first period



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































later in the game. As the second period quality level is reduced due to higher
fixed cost, the firm is not able to charge as high of a price in the second period.
Thus, the second period price drops as ↵2 increases. This type of firm behav-
ior clearly shows that the monopolist producer engages in planned obsolescence.
Even when the firm is relative e cient in the first period at developing the new
good quality and relatively ine cient in the second period at developing new
features, it chooses to develop the first period quality of its products at a lower
level so that the competition raised by these first period products will not be too
sharp in the second period. Another way of saying this is, the firm voluntarily
produces first period products with lower quality when it is not as powerful at
competing against its own products in the second period.
I observe in the middle one third of the table, discount factor   is fixed at
0.6. As the fixed cost parameters are the same and increase at the same time,
it becomes more and more di cult for the monopolist to develop higher quality
products. The total profit of the firm decreases, as well as the quality levels
in both periods. The quality di↵erence between the two period quality levels
will shrink as the fixed cost parameters increase as well. In the bottom one
third of the table, the fixed cost parameters are fixed at a constant level of 0.4
and the discount factor is floating. The simulation results show that the total
profit of the monopolist producer is increasing as the discount factor increases.
The increasing trend of the total profit could be explained by intuition. When
consumers evaluate their second period utility higher, everyone expects that the
second period consumption is going to be higher in either the new good market
or the used good market or both. If people expect more transactions in the used
good market, the first period new good sales are going to increase. Thus, the firm
will have a higher total profit. In the case where the discount factor is greater,
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Variable Partial Corr. Significance
p2 0.9788 0.0000
q2   q1 -0.9845 0.000
Table 2.2: Partial Correlations of s2 with p2 and q2   q1
the monopolist firm is able to charge a higher price in the first period and willing
to develop a higher quality as well.
According to my discussion, the firm’s choice of price and quality improvement
in the second period has e↵ects on the supply and demand curves of the used
goods. My discussion shows that the firm has an incentive to engage in planned
obsolescence in the sense of developing quality improvement of the second period
new good to compete against the used products. The firm’s pricing strategy
also a↵ects the used good market activities in the second period. The used good
price will be able to reach a higher level when the new good price is set higher
by the firm. The top one third of Table 2.1 shows that: as the second period
fixed cost parameter increases, 1) the new good price is increasing, 2) the quality
improvement is decreasing, and 3) the used good price is increasing as well. I can
observe the inverse relationship between the quality improvement and the used
good price but I fail to see the expected correlation between the new good price
and the used good price. The lower two thirds of the table shows an even weaker
pattern as expected. This is because both price and quality choices are a↵ecting
the used good price in the second period. One way I can show both relationships
is by showing the partial correlation between s2 and (p2, q2   q1) given all other
endogenous variables as control variables.
I have the partial correlations of s2 with these two variables shown in Table
2.2. I see both partial correlations are statistically significant. The used good
58
price, s2, is positively correlated with the new good price in the second period,
p2, having all other endogenous variables as controls. The partial correlation
between s2 and the quality improvement, q2   q1, is negative. This shows that
a lower resale price in the secondary market is associated with higher a quality
improvement level, which reflects the idea of planned obsolescence. When firms
adopt planned obsolescence by improving the new generation quality, the used
good price drops.
The partial correlation table, Table 2.2, gives out an idea that leads to the em-
pirical investigation in the remainder of the chapter. If the firm adopts planned
obsolescence in order to compete with its own products, I must be able to employ
real world data and estimate an equation where the used good price is the de-
pendent variable and the new good price, the quality improvement measure, and
some other control variables are used as independent variables. I will adopt in-
strumental variables method for estimation due to potential endogeneity of some
control variables. My model clearly suggests that all firm decision choices in both
periods are endogenous. On the other hand, the model shows that firms’ ability
levels of developing new features are appropriate instruments. The proposed es-
timation will generate similar results as the partial correlations. The used good
price will be driven down by quality improvement and will be driven higher as
the firm charges a higher new good price.
2.4 An Empirical Test
In order to test the main prediction of the theoretical model, I empirically examine
the video game industry. The video-game industry lines up well with my research
problem for several reasons. First, video games are clearly durable goods that
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su↵er little in the way of physical depreciation with use. Second, video games have
an active second-hand market and sales in the used game market are considerable.
Third, for a select subset of games, sports games for instance, the introduction
of the new generation is regular and relatively predictable. For example, football
games always come out at the time when a new football season starts. Thus,
timing issues with regard to the introduction of the next generation are not
generally a concern for an important class of video games.
2.4.1 Empirical Investigation
Industry
In order to test the main prediction of the theoretical model, I empirically examine
the video game industry. The video-game industry lines up well with my research
problem for several reasons. First, video games are clearly durable goods that
su↵er little in the way of physical depreciation with use. Second, video games have
an active second-hand market and sales in the used game market are considerable.
Third, for a select subset of games, sports games for instance, the introduction
of the new generation is regular and relatively predictable. For example, football
games always come out at the time when a new football season starts. Thus,
timing issues with regard to the introduction of the next generation are not
generally a concern for an important class of video games.
Basic Data Introduction
In order to investigate the problem of role of quality upgrading in a durable goods
industry with a second-hand market, I use high-frequency data for the video
game industry in the United States. My data contain information on weekly
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sales, weekly prices, and product characteristics at the game-title level. The data
contain information on prices and quantities for new games and the selling prices
of used games but not information on the quantities sold in the used game market.
The price data are available from mid-2008 to mid-2010. As stated in Chapter
1, the weekly price data are provided by Cosmic Shovel, Inc and the weekly sales
data are obtained from the VGChartz group. The game characteristic variables
are collected separately for each game. The data set includes all recent sport game
and vehicle simulation game series; specifically, a game title will be included if
the title was released after January 1st, 2006. The data run through May 2010
and any game title released afterwards will not be in the data set.
Regression Equation
As described in the theoretical model, firms will compete with their own used
products by setting the price and the quality level of their new generation prod-
ucts. In this empirical investigation, I will employ a basic regression model and
illustrate the e↵ects of quality improvement and new good pricing on the used
good price in the video game market. The intuition of the second stage of the
model in Chapter Two and the regression results in Table 2.2 indicate that the
used good price will be lower when the quality improvement is higher and will
be higher as the new good price in the second period goes up.
I will adopt the following regression equation according to the relationship
between the used good price and the new generation price and quality:
pusedit = ↵i +  0Oldit +  1Weeksit +  2Weeksit ⇥Oldit +  3pnewit +  4pnewit ⇥Oldit
+ ~ 5 it +  6Stockit +  7Stockit ⇥Oldit +  8Xmasit +  9Xmasit ⇥Oldit + "it,
(2.50)
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where pusedit indicates the used good price for game title i at time t, Weeksit is
the number of weeks that game title i has been available at time t, Oldit is a
dummy variable that indicates whether game title i is an older generation game
title at time t, pnewit is the new good price of game title i at time t,  it is a
vector that measures the quality di↵erence between game title i and the current
most up-to-date corresponding game generation at time t2, Stockit is the total
historical sales of game title i up to time t, and Xmas is a dummy variable that
indicates the Christmas shopping season.The two interaction terms are included
in order to investigate the di↵erent e↵ects on the used good price before and after
a newer generation is introduced. I have weekly observations for each variable in
Eq (2.50).
Traditional planned obsolescence literature has focused on the inter-relationship
between quality upgrading and competition from the used good market. I will
treat three variables as endogenous in the above regression. The new good price,
the stock of existing goods sold and the quality of the good. Clearly, the price of
the new good and the stock of the existing good sold will be related to competi-
tion from the used good market. Lower used good prices could either a↵ect prices
or quantities in the new good market. With respect to quality choice, if firms
are forward-looking they may factor in the e↵ect of the second-hand market on
their investments in quality improvements. The theory points in this direction.
However, from an empirical standpoint, the endogeneity problem may not be so
evident, as quality is chosen well before products change hands in the second-hand
market. Still, I will treat this variable as potentially endogenous.
The structure of the empirical model allows for general trends in used goods
2
It is quite obvious that when Oldit = 0,  it = ~0. A more detailed description of this will
be shown later.
62
prices through the Weeksit variable, shifts in the used good prices when new
generations are released, and interatctions of these terms. Thus, I control for a
very general set of price movements in the used good market, allowing both slope
and intercept shifts with the introducation of the new generation of goods. My
key test of the model, however, centers around the vector  it that includes my
proxy variables for quality improvements in the new generation of goods relative
to the existing generation. The idea here if quality improvement is high for a
given game title, relative to its previous generations, this will put downward
pressure on prices in the second-hand market as consumers substitute away from
the older games. A critical issue, therefore, is the measurement game quality and
improvements in quality across generations. I discuss this below.
My estimation approach will be relatively straightforward, employing a stan-
dard panel data framework to analyze the evolution of the used goods price. Fixed
e↵ects are included for each game title, time is measured in weeks since a game
was introduced and robust or clustered standard errors at the game title-level are
incorporated in the estimation of each model.
Price Variables
The key data that form the basis of the estimation is the time-series data on new
and used prices. For the new good prices pnewit , since I have both the Amazon
o cial new good prices and the third party new good prices available, I have to
make a decision of which one to employ in my actual regression. According to
an estimate done by Trefis company, the third party sales are 30% of all items
sold on Amazon.com. In this case, it makes better sense to use the Amazon
new good price as my pnewit values. However, I can check the robustness of this
choice. A consumer who purchases online can be afraid that the seller is not
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trustworthy. As one of the leading online business company, Amazon itself is well
trusted by the consumers. I would think that the third party new good price
will not exceed the Amazon o cial new good price since consumers will always
buy from Amazon directly if the Amazon price is lower. The third party sellers
can only charge higher prices than the Amazon price when consumers are not
able to buy from Amazon directly. Figure 1.2 shows that the third party new
good price can be higher during the shopping season. It is likely caused by the
fact that Amazon goes out of stock and not able to provide su cient supply to
the market. If this is the case, I will employ Amazon price during regular time
and employ the third party price as the actually market price for the new goods
during shopping season. I can use the higher value between the third party price
and Amazon price as the pnewit in my regression.
Control and Generation Dummy Variables
There are generally strong downward trends in the used good price as a product
ages and it will be important to distinguish between these trends and downward
movements due to changes in the relative quality of the new generation. All
my models will include a very general form of time trends controlling for the
time since the game was released and allowing for shifts in the intercepts and
slopes of the trends, as new generations are introduced. The idea here is that
I want a generous parameterization of the model to help isolate the e↵ects due
to quality improvements from trend e↵ects and e↵ects due to the introduction of
additional competing products. These e↵ects are captured by the Weeksit and
Oldit variables and the corresponding interactions.
Recall Fig 1.3, there are seasonal e↵ects in the data, especially as consumption
rises during the Christmas shopping season. I include a dummy for the shopping
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season and any week that ends between November 25th and January 2nd will
have the Christmas shopping dummy value set to 1. In addition, I control for the
overall stock of items sold as an estimate of the potential supply of used goods.
The stock variable is calculated by adding up all historical quantity sold in every
week. I show the mean game sales for all games and only football games in each
week after the introduction in Figure 1.33. The seasonal trend is shown better
for the football game quantity series and the Christmas shopping season is easily
captured by the diagram. I am able to construct this variable because I have
weekly sales of each game title during the time period in my data set. When
there is a larger stock, the competition among sellers in the used good market is
likely to put downward pressure on the used good price.
Quality Measure and Characteristics Variables
One of the key measurement challenges I face is to quantify the quality di↵erence
between an existing good and the new generation of goods. Clearly, character-
izing game product attributes is a di cult task and I will rely on a number of
alternative measures; however, a main source of information on product quality
di↵erences come in the form of game reviews. I measure game quality and change
in game quality by combining information from the ratings and some standards
of the game titles. In the actual regression part, I include only “Critic Score” as
the quality measure.
The other variable to consider that deals with game characteristics is the num-
ber of compatible platforms a game serves. Normally, a more popular game will
be compatible to a greater number of platforms, which might illustrate a higher
3
The first week is not shown since the pattern will not be as visualized if I include the
extremely high football game sale in the first week of introduction.
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quality game. Furthermore, since a certain game generation will not necessarily
release game titles for all consoles at the same time, the number of compatible
platforms can di↵er by game title and by game generation over time. I see some
game generations start with a compatibility level and later become compatible to
more consoles. In this case, it is nature to assume that this game generation has
a been a success and the firm is willing to put additional R&D into developing
game titles for more platforms. Since a greater compatibility level means greater
investment in R&D costs, only firms with better R&D ability develop their game
generations compatible to more consoles. This also tells that the compatibility
level and game quality are associated.
Since I care more about the quality improvements, I develop measures of such
variables by using the di↵erence between the variable of the game title in interest
and the variable of the newest generation in the game series that my game title
in interest belongs to. I develop variables “ GS Critics” and “ Compatibility”
as quality improvement measures4.
Instrumental Variables
The estimation strategy discussed above involves the use of instrumental variables
methodology. In particular, the new good price, the stock of existing goods sold,
and product quality will be treated as endogenous variables. My approach for
both the new good price and stock variables is to rely on lagged values of price
and quantity variables as the instruments. Recall the new good price is measured
in two ways. For each formulation, I will use the lagged value of the Amazon
new good price as the instruments, with a four week lag. The assumption is that
4
A more detailed discussion of the development of these two variables can be found in the
Appendix.
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consumers considering purchasing in the used good market only use relatively
recent information on new good prices in their decision to purchase a used good.
Thus, using a four week lag seems appropriate; however, I check the robustness
of this assumption by allowing for alternative lag structures in supplementary
analyses.
The stock variable is likely endogenous, as well, in my model. I take a similar
approach to the new price variable and instrument the stock variable with a
lagged value. In this case, I assume that shocks to the used good market price,
which might e↵ect demand in the new good, die out relatively quickly. Again, I
employ the stock value lagged four weeks.
I also treat the quality improvement as endogenous in my regression equation.
Lagged values are inappropriate instruments in this case, since product quality
di↵erences are measured infrequently in my data. Fortunately, I am able to
construct a set of variables that I believe are correlated with game title quality.
These variables are based on quality measures of the producers of the game titles.
Like individual video games, there are industry rankings on game publishers and
developers. I construct not only the developer score and publisher score but also
the di↵erences of these two scores as the instruments for the di↵erence of game
review rating score and the di↵erence of compatibility level since both of these
two measures of quality di↵erence are believed to be endogenous. The way of
constructing the developer score di↵erence and publisher score di↵erence is the
same as the construction of “ GS Critics” and “ Compatibility”.
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pnew Choice mea max{men,mea}
Coe cient Std. Error Coe cient Std. Error
Old -459.10*** 172.88 -213.84 143.98
pnew 0.617*** 0.024 0.5568*** 0.0206
pnew ⇥Old -0.224*** 0.0354 -0.2211*** 0.0301
Weeks -14.38*** 0.901 -14.47*** 0.786
Weeks⇥Old 9.682*** 1.223 8.718*** 0.997
Xmas 180.645*** 26.282 203.92*** 22.38
Xmas⇥Old -49.877 32.121 -104.24*** 27.617
Stock -0.0012*** 0.000 -0.0013*** 0.0001
Stock ⇥Old 0.0003*** 0.000 0.0002*** 0.000
 Compatibility -335.83*** 32.464 -142.08** 27.144
 GS Critics 343.43*** 76.833 324.82*** 61.60
Cons 1181.56*** 120.38 1307.31*** 109.25
R-squared 0.4740 0.6130
# of Obs 8704 8704
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10%
level.
Table 2.3: Regression Results
2.4.2 Empirical Results
I o↵er two alternative specification that vary with the specific new good price
included in the model. I present my empirical results in Table 2.3. Overall, I see
quite consistent estimate for both regressions. My empirical results show that
the used good price decreases over time. However, when the game title is not
one of the newest generation game titles, the decreasing trend has a flatter slope
in the sense that the speed of depreciation is slower. On average, the used good
price of newest generation product falls by 14 cents per week. After the game
titles ages, the used good price will only be lowered by 4 to 5 cents every week.
Looking at the e↵ect of the new good price, I see it is both positive and
statistically significant. More competition from new goods depresses used good
prices. For new generation games, if the retailers set the new good price 1 cent
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higher, the used good price will rise by 0.6 cents. When the game title gets old,
the same increment of the new good price has a more muted e↵ect, increasing by
only 0.3 cents.
The Christmas shopping season variable has the expected e↵ect – prices rise in
the holiday season. Overall, a newest generation game title’s used good price will
increase by approximately $2 during the Christmas shopping season compared to
goods sold in other periods.
The amount of historical sales of a particular game title indicates the potential
supply in the secondary market. Not surprisingly, the coe cient on Stock is
negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the estimate indicates
that when the total stock increases by roughly 1000 copies, the used good price
drops by 1 cent. When the game title gets old, it will take around 1000 copies
increment in the total stock to reduce the used good price by 1 cent.
The compatibility variable is also negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. This shows that when the new generation is compatible to more con-
soles, the used good price of the older game titles will be reduced. This is con-
sistent with the idea that quality improvement can reduce the resale price of the
used goods and the number of consoles served by a game is a proxy for game
quality. That is, higher quality games are ported to a wider variety of consoles.
Up to this point, all my findings agree with either the theory presented or with
basic priors. However, my current models show that my main measure of quality
– based on game critics’ reviews, is positive and statistically significant. This
result is clearly not consistent with the theory. However, there may be several
plausible explanations for the finding. One is purely a measurement issue in the
data. In general, I observe a downward sloping trend of the overall game ratings.
This means that the consumers have been more and more critical towards new
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games. A decrease in the absolute rating score does not necessarily show that
the new game is worse than the older games. In further extension, I will develop
models that remove this trend in critics’ game reviews from the analysis. The
other reason is that if the new game generation has a better quality, consumers
raise their interests towards the older generation game titles. This increasing
interest makes the used good price increase.
2.4.3 Robustness Check
An alternative way to measure the quality of a game title is using the system
requirements. When a game requires a more sophisticated platform to run, this
game tends to have a better image quality and higher standards. Unfortunately,
there are problems with employing system requirements as quality measures.
First of all, a game title is only compatible to one game console and the con-
sole features are fixed relative to di↵erent game titles in the sense that all games
compatible to a certain game console will have the same system standard observ-
tions. A game title might have the same game generation compatible to personal
computers. However, this raises the second problem. PC system requirements
will vary across di↵erent game generations but will be the same across di↵erent
game titles within the same game. Still, PC system requirements may be used
as a good measure of the quality levels of game generations. The third problem
with adopting the system requirements is that not all games have a title that is
compatible to personal computers. So the data availability will be limited if I
measure game qualities in this way. The last potential problem is that consumers
have to purchase a console first in order to buy video game discs. When the newer
generation games have much higher system requirements, the newer generation
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games may be too sophisticated for a consumer’s current console to run. In this
case, a consumer might be forced to purchase the used product instead of the
new one.
A PC game will have a set of minimum system requirements and a set of rec-
ommended system requirements. They include system requirements for memory
space, hard drive space, video, and processor speed. Due to the greater data
availability, I employ the minimum system requirements as quality measures
rather than recommended system requirements. Since I only have two instru-
mental variables for the quality measures, I will include one system requirement
variable and the variable  GS Critics as quality measures. Due to the high cor-
relation between  Memory Req and  Hard Req, I only include results where
 Memory Req is included in the regression equation. Table 2.4 shows estima-
tion results of some alternative regressions where me a is used as the new good
price in all regressions.
I observe similar estimation results as in Table 2.3. More importantly, the
coe cients for the quality change variables now make much better sense. The
change in rating variable is now negative and significant for two cases. This shows
the negative e↵ect of quality improvement of the newer generation on the older
generation used good prices. On average, if the rating of the newer generation
is increased by 1, the used good price for the older generation game title will be
reduced by $4.8. The change in system requirements have statistically insignifi-
cant positive coe cients. This fact shows that the last problem with using system
requirements to measure game quality level can be critical in a↵ecting my estima-
tion. However, since the system requirement change variable is never significant,
it seems a new generation video game with higher PC system requirements is not




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The theoretical model in this chapter shows that the producers of durable goods
are able to reduce the competition from the secondary market of their own prod-
ucts. While firms has a strong incentive to develop new generation products with
highest possible quality level in order to make the products they previously sold as
obsolete as possible, their ability of developing high quality products are limited.
This restriction on R&D makes the firms combine pricing strategies and quality
improvement in order to compete with their own products in the secondary mar-
ket. The regression results of my empirical model mainly supports the hypothesis
raised by the theory. The firm is always able to compete against its own used
good by adopting lower new good prices. Since the firm always likes higher price
margins, it has to use quality improvement to kill o↵ the competition. I find the
inverse relationship between quality improvements and used good prices in one
of the two quality measures I employ.
For further extension, I will develop a better measure for game title quality
levels. I will need to adjust all rating scores of a game title according to the
average ratings received by similar games that are released in the same time span
in order to accommodate for the decreasing trend of the overall game ratings. I
may consider more sophisticated econometrics techniques that I may employ to
analyze my data. Since I have a✏uent time variance in the price and quantity
data. I will be able to consider a dynamic panel structure of my data set and
investigate the e↵ects of prices and quality improvements on the used good price.
Due to the availability of the weekly sales data, some research along the line
of BLP models may result in interesting insights as well. Since all consumers
of durable goods will have a chance to sell their purchases in the secondary
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market, consumers are not really paying the retail prices of the durable goods.
By imposing a structural model to consumer consumption choices and firms’
behaviors, I will be able to obtain di↵erent results than a traditional di↵erentiated




Estimation with Used Market
Activities
3.1 Introduction
When you step into a video game store, you will find almost all the newest
releases of the current year on the shelves and many other older generations
of video games in the baskets near the shelves. If you open the Amazon.com or
other online stores’ websites, you will see it is even easier to find older generations
of video games. A video game consumer knows the existence of the secondary
market and uses the secondary market to earn resale prices for the games she
does not want any more. Since a video game owner is able to participate in the
second hand market, she does not necessarily incur the full retail price in order
to own a video game for a period of time.
In this chapter, I employ data from the video game market in order to estimate
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a di↵erentiated products model and quantify the impact of the second hand
market on new good prices. Video games have an active second hand market
because they are durable goods that su↵er little from wear or tear. Video game
producers frequently introduce new generations of video games into the market.
The new games compete with those of other video game producers and with the
firm’s own older generations of products. Such behavior is defined as planned
obsolescence. These properties require me to emphasize rental price, which is the
di↵erence between the retail price and future resale price, as well as the retail
price and to consider carefully how to calculate the actual price incurred by a
consumer in order to play a video game.
The most important hypothesis I test is that rental price plays a more im-
portant role than the straight retail price. For instance, if the resale price for a
certain video game is very high, a consumer might still be willing to purchase
this game at a very high retail price. This is because the actual price paid by the
consumer in order to experience all the features of the game is not very high if
she is going to sell the game in the second hand market. I construct the demand
side equation in multiple ways in order to show the di↵erence between models
with just retail prices included and models where both retail prices and used good
prices are considered. The results show that it is necessary to include not only
the retail prices but the resale prices as well.
Traditional di↵erentiated products models developed by Berry (1994), Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes(1995), henceforth BLP, Nevo (2001), and others employ
retail prices as the prices actually paid by the consumers. This is valid when
the product of interest is either non-durable or does not have an active second
hand market. The scarcity of data from secondary markets has also restricted
researchers from looking into rental prices. More recently, Gordon (2006) and
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Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2008) change the traditional BLP model into a
dynamic model. However, in these dynamic BLP models, retail prices are still
used primarily as the actual price for the product of interest. In this chapter,
rental prices in the video game market will be used as the prices paid by con-
sumers. Schiraldi (2011) includes the second hand car market in his investigation
of the Italian automobile industry. Although the main purpose of his paper is
to estimate the transaction cost, his paper is able to show the significance of the
second hand market in the automobile industry. With the rental prices, I am
able to show more reasonable and accurate estimation results compared to the
ones obtained by employing only retail prices.
The mechanism that decides the resale price of a durable good plays an im-
portant role in determining the rental prices. Most durable good producers face
competition not only from their competitors but also from the used versions of
their own products. In this case, durable goods competitors engage in planned
obsolescence in order to reduce the competition from the secondary markets.
Such behavior is studied by Rust (1986), Waldman (1996) and others. When
the producers are using the new generation products to compete against older
generations of products, the resale value of a used product of older generations
will rely on the quality improvement of the newest generation. Dhebar(1994) and
Kornish (2001) attempt to explain the e↵ects of quality improvements, they find
it di cult to guarantee the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium when the
secondary market activities are not included. Chapter 2 incorporates endogenous
quality improvement levels chosen by the producer and the second hand market
activities and find out a relationship between the used good prices and the quality
improvement levels.
With the development of the video game market, more and more studies are
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done in this industry. Nair (2007) uses a dynamic model to investigate producers’
pricing decisions when they face forward-looking video game consumers who tend
to hold their transaction decision and wait for lower prices. Ishihara (2010) adopts
a dynamic di↵erentiated product model with second hand market transactions
and finds out that the existences of the second hand market and the rental price
actually help the video game producers to raise their overall revenue. Due to
the availability of the prices and quantities of new and used video game titles
combined with used game titles’ trade-in prices and the inventory levels for each
used game title, he is able to estimate the depreciation of consumption values
and the elasticity values that account for inter-temporal substitution. His results
show that the existence of the secondary market in the video game industry is
indeed able to influence the demand of the new game titles. Lee (2010) attempts
to show that video game market incumbents are able to create higher profits by
making some video game titles only compatible to their own consoles. From the
previous literature, I see a clear platform e↵ect. Video games can only be played
on certain consoles. I am not going to explore this network e↵ect in this project,
but I will include video games that are compatible to a large number of consoles.
The main structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides an intro-
duction of the data. Section 3 of this chapter introduces the empirical model and
estimation methods. The section after the model consists of estimation results
and some further discussions. Section 5 shows future extensions and conclusions.
3.2 Data Introduction
As stated in Chapter 1, my data covers video games of two genres: sports and
vehicle simulation. I include all video games of these two genres that are a
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member of a game series and are released between January 1, 2006 and May 1,
2010. I only include games that belong to a series of games since I intend to
investigate the impact on the future resale values of video games that is caused
by characteristics di↵erences between di↵erent generations of games. In this case,
I only collect data for games that are a part of a game series. My data set for
this chapter contains new good price, second hand good price, new good weekly
sales, and product characteristics for each game title that is included.
3.3 Model and Estimation Methods
In my model, I adopt the basic settings from the Berry(1994) model. I assume
that consumer i will obtain utility uijt if she owns product j in time period t:
uijt = xjt    ↵prjt + ⇠j + ⇠jt + "ijt, (3.1)
where xjt are product characteristics at time t, prjt is the rental price at time t
(retail price at time t minus potential resale price at time t), ⇠j are unobserved
product specific value,  ⇠jt is a product time specific deviation from the all
time mean value, and "ijt is a zero-mean idiosyncratic error term. Assume i =
1, 2, · · · , N , j = 1, 2, · · · , Jt, and t = 1, 2, · · · , T . Jt is number of new video game
titles available at time t.
More specifically, my model is di↵erent from the typical discrete choice de-
mand model due to the price term in the utility function. Since durable good
owners will be able to sell their products in the second hand market for a re-
sale price, consumers in durable good markets do not actually pay the retail
prices in order to enjoy the utility of a durable goods. If one wants to obtain
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accurate estimates of the own and cross price elasticities and price elasticities of
other product characteristics, adopting a correct rental price, prjt, is critical. I
will explore multiple ways to construct the rental price in the later part of the
chapter.
In the notation of the previous literature, the mean utility for game title j in
period t is:
 jt = xjt    ↵prjt + ⇠j + ⇠jt. (3.2)
If a consumer chooses not to own a good at time t, she will obtain an indirect
utility level that is given by the outside option, indicated by j = 0:
ui0t =  0t + "0t, (3.3)
where  0t is normalized to zero.
Consumers are assumed to purchase at most one copy of a new video game
title in each time period. Consumers choose product j that maximizes their
utility at time t.










Berry (1994) shows that the parameters of the utility function can be recovered
using regression Eq(3.5),
lnSjt   lnS0t = xjt    ↵prjt + ⇠j + ⇠jt. (3.5)
The market share for game title j in period t is constructed by using the
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quantity of game title j sold in period t divided by the total sales of the console
that plays game title j by the end of the year that week t belongs to. The outside
share is calculated using one minus the summation of weekly quantities at time
t of all game titles that are included in my data.
The product characteristics vector xjt includes a quality measure of product j,
the quality di↵erence between product j and the newest product in the game series
that product j belongs to, the total sales of product j until time t  1, the total
sales of the console that plays product j until the year before time t, a dummy
variable (old) that indicates whether this game title j is the newest generation
game, the number of weeks this game title has been released, a dummy variable
(xmas) that indicates whether time period t is during the Christmas shopping
season, and some interaction terms.
For the game quality measure, I include a measure of quality and a measure of
quality improvement. I adopt the critic rating on Gamespot.com, “GSCritics”,
to measure game quality. I use the di↵erence between the rating of the game
title of interest and the rating of the newest generation game title of the same
game series (“ GSCritics”) to measure the quality improvement of the game
title of interest. Obviously, the quality measure will show a zero if the game title
of interest is of the newest generation in that game series at time t. Due to the
limited ability to collect data, the game quality measures are time-invariant and
the quality improvement measures are time variant since they change when a new
generation is released. A game series dummy is included as well to pick up the
common facts of all game titles in each game series.
The error term in Eq(3.5) has the form of ⇠j +  ⇠jt. If I do not include
game title dummies, I am likely to have a problem with endogeneity that ⇠j is
correlated with prices. I would be able to take care of the endogeneity problem by
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adopting fixed e↵ects. However, due to the lack of time-variant quality measures
of game titles, I have to estimate the model using random e↵ects. In order to
control for the overall quality of each game series, I include game series dummies.
I include console dummies to control for the e↵ects brought by each di↵erent
gaming consoles. Some instrumental variables will be considered for taking care
of the endogeneity problem. I show later in the results that the endogeneity
problem is not very severe to begin with.
3.3.1 Identification
In order to obtain unbiased estimators for Eq(3.5), I need to make sure that both
price and characteristics are not correlated with the error term. However, an
endogeneity problem is likely to be in existence. So, the estimation discussed
above involves the use of instrumental variables methodology. In particular, the
price and product quality will be treated as endogenous variables. My approach
for the price variable is to rely on lagged values of new good and used good price
variables as the instruments. Since I have both the Amazon new good price,
the third party new good price, and the used good price in my data set, I will
used lagged values for all three variables as instruments for price observations
in Eq(3.5). I also treat the quality improvement as endogenous in my regression
equation. Lagged values are inappropriate instruments in this case, since product
quality di↵erences are measured infrequently in my data. Fortunately, I have
variables in my data set that describe the video game producers’ ability levels.
According to the model in Chapter 2, these variables can be used as instruments
for quality measures. Variables “developer” and “publisher” will be employed as
instruments.
82
3.3.2 Di↵erent Estimation Models
Before I actually run any regression based on Eq(3.5), I consider several possible
models that I can estimate. These models are di↵erent across the the choice of
price observations and rental price constructions.
Model One
In order to obtain a comparison between the adoption of rental prices and the
adoption of retail prices in Eq(3.5), I first consider only the retail price. Recall
that I have two price series in the data: Amazon o cial new good price and
the third party new good price. At most times, the third party new good price
is lower than the Amazon o cial price for a certain product. According to an
estimate done by Trefis company, the third party sales are only 30% of all items
sold on Amazon.com. It makes better sense to utilize the Amazon price over the
third party new good price. However, the third party new good price can be
higher during the shopping season. It is likely caused by the fact that Amazon
goes out of stock and is not able to provide su cient supply to the market. I can
use the higher value between the third party price and Amazon price as the price
in my regression. The retail price can be shown in an equation as follows,
pnewjt = max{pait, pnjt}. (3.6)
I use pnewjt as p
r
it in Eq(3.5) to run the regression.
Model Two
Model two adopts a rental price instead of the retail price. This rental price is
constructed by using the retail price at time t minus the used good price at time
83
t + 1. In this case, I am assuming that consumers have perfect foresight of the
future resale price and the future resale price is exogenous to consumers at time
t. For the used good price pu, I simply adopt the used good price observations,
usu, from my data set. This rental price can be shown as:
p1jt = p
new
jt   puj,t+1. (3.7)
I employ p1jt as the rental price in the main regression in Model Two.
Model Three
Some may argue that consumers do not have perfect foresight about the future
resale price. The used good price in the future is decided based on some known
knowledge at the current time period and a random error. As in Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2008) and Schiraldi(2011), I assume the used good price at time
t+1 is decided solely based on the information at time t. Furthermore, I assume
the used good price at time t+ 1 is decided according to an equation as follows,




j,t 1 +  3stockj,t 1 +  4oldj,t
+  5weeksj,t +  6weeks
2
j,t +  7xmasj,t + ↵i + uj,t.
(3.8)
I believe that the used good price is determined by previous new and used
good prices combined with some other characteristics. According to Fig 1.1,
the used video game price declines over time. However, the slope of the used
good price is becoming flatter as the game title gets older. I include both the
linear and quadratic terms for the number of weeks the product j has been
released. stockj,t 1 is the number of product j sold until time period t  1. This
variable describes the population of potential sellers in the secondary market.
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Dummies old and xmas indicate wether product j is already not one of the
newest generation game titles and wether period t is during a Christmas shopping
season. Both of these two variables a↵ect the resale price at time t. Since the
price and stock variables are from the previous time period, there is not a strong
endogeneity problem in estimating this first stage.
I can test whether Eq(3.8) contains autocorrelation. By running a Wooldridge
test, I reject the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the panel data
regression in Eq(3.8). This conclusion suggests that there is autocorrelation in
Eq(3.8). After I have estimated all the parameters for this first stage, I will be
able to obtain a prediction of the future resale price, [pui,t+1, for each product at
each time period by calculating the fitted value of Eq(3.8). Now I can construct




jt   E(puj,t+1) = pnewjt   [puj,t+1. (3.9)
I will use this rental price in Eq(3.5) for model three.
Model Four
It is true that consumers who purchase brand new video game titles do not all
participate in the second hand market. If only a small portion of new video game
buyers intend to sell their video games for the resale price, the rental price might
not play such an important role in their decision making. In this case, I attempt
to show that both the retail price and the expected future resale price have to
be included in my main regression, Eq(3.5). Assuming perfect foresight of the
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future resale price, I can rewrite Eq(3.5) as follows,
lnSjt   lnS0t = xjt    ↵(pnewjt    · Et(puj,t+1)) + ✏jt
= xjt    ↵(pnewjt    · puj,t+1) + ✏jt.
(3.10)
I am assuming that consumers include both the current period retail price and
the next period resale price into their considerations before they purchase a video
game title. The adoption of the actual future resale price is based on the assump-
tion of perfect foresight. By regression Eq(3.10), I can test the significance of 
and illustrate the participation of video game buyers in the second hand market
using the estimated  value as well. When  takes a small value, it means that
the majority of consumers who buy brand new video games do not consider re-
selling in the second hand market. A large  value confirms my idea that rental
price is the real price paid by a consumer for a video game title. Model two can
be interpreted as a specific version of this model where  is fixed at 1.
Model Five
If I do not assume that consumers can predict the next period used good price
perfectly, I will employ the predicted future used good price instead of the actual
value. I rewrite the main regression equation as
lnSjt   lnS0t = xjt    ↵(pnewjt    · Et(puj,t+1)) + ✏jt
= xjt    ↵(pnewjt    · [puj,t+1) + ✏jt.
(3.11)
The same idea applies here. I will be able to use the regression results of Eq(3.11)
to show two things. First, consumers include the possibility of selling the video
game title in the second hand market when they decide to purchase a new video
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game title. Second, the magnitude of  shows how often consumers actually think
of and participate in the secondary market.
Obviously, all of the five models listed above have an endogeneity problem.
Prices and quality measures are endogenous variables. Thus, instruments will be
used to obtain unbiased estimates. In order to di↵erentiate game series, dummy
variables that indicate which game series the game title of interest belongs to
are included in all five models. Dummy variables that indicate which platform is
each game title compatible to are included as well.
Model Six
I adopt the settings in model five and ignore the possible endogeneity problem.
Model six will run an OLS regression. I show in the results that the OLS re-
gression and IV panel data regression generate similar but not identical results.
Thus, the endogeneity problem is worth some attention in my investigation.
3.4 Empirical Results and Experiments
3.4.1 Empirical Results
When I estimate the demand model using model three or model five, I need to
obtain predicted future resale prices. I have to run a first stage regression using
Eq(3.8). As discussed and tested before, I will run the regression using fixed
e↵ects with AR(1) error term. The first stage results are shown in Table(3.1).
With these results, I am able to use the fitted values for [puj,t+1 as the expected
used good price. I will be able to fully execute my empirical investigation with
model three and model five.
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The first stage results tell me how consumers of new video games predict the
future resale value of their game titles. The current new game title price and
current used good price both have positive and statistically significant e↵ects on
the next period used good price. The quality di↵erence of the game title of interest
and the game title of the newest generation has a negative but not statistically
significant e↵ect on the future resale price. When the current retail price and
used good price is one dollar higher, the used good price will be increased by 13
cents and 49.6 cents respectively. The total stock of this game title, which is the
total number of copies sold up till the current time period, indicates the supply
side of the used games. When the population of potential sellers in the secondary
market goes up, the used good price decreases. The coe cients for weeks and
weeks2 shows that the predicted used good price is decreasing over time but the
overall trend is convex. The xmas dummy shows that the used good price will
be raised by one dollar sixteen cents on average during the Christmas shopping
season. A negative and statistically significant old dummy shows that video game
titles that do not belong to the newest generation in the market will have a lower
resale value.
With all the variables in the main regression equation Eq(3.5) constructed, I
am able to obtain the estimation results based on di↵erent models listed before.
The regression results are shown in Table(3.2) and Table(3.3)1.
According to Table (3.2), consumers obtain higher utility levels when the
prices they pay are lower or the product ratings are higher. The utility levels are
influenced by the number of weeks the game title of interest has been released,
whether the time period of interest in during a Christmas shopping season, and
1













# of obs 7979
R2 0.7131
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10%
level.
Table 3.1: First Stage Results
whether the game title of interest is the current newest generation game title or
not. If the game title of interest is not among the newest generation games, the
utility levels generated by this game title will be lower if the quality di↵erence
between this game title and the corresponding newest generation game title is
larger.
More specifically, I can compare model one to models two and three. In model
one, the retail prices are treated as actual prices paid by consumers. However, the
parameter estimate is not statistically significant. When I employ rental prices
as actual prices paid by consumers, the coe cients are statistically significant
and negative. In the mean time, the magnitudes of the parameter estimates for
the non-price variables in model one are generally greater than the ones from
model two and model three. This is because these variables are related to the
future resale prices. By excluding the used good price in model one, all other
variables seem to matter more. This shows the importance of including rental


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimates when I include rental prices.
When I assume the rental price really takes the form prjt = p
new   Et(puj,t+1)
as in Eq(3.10) and Eq(3.11), I am not imposing a specific value for . Table(3.3)
shows that the coe cients for the future used good price are statistically sig-
nificant in both models four and five. Furthermore, the current new good price
has a negative estimate while the future resale price’s estimate is significantly
positive. This shows that consumers obtain higher utility when the retail price
is lower or the future resale price is lower. Consumers are more likely not able
to perfectly predict the future resale price of a certain video game title. By em-
ploying the predicted future used good price, I show that consumers care about
the future resale value even more when they are considering whether or not to
purchase a new video game title. When I compare Table(3.3) to Table(3.2), I find
that some parameter estimates lose statistical significances. For variables stock
and console sales, this loss of significance is easy to explain and more intuitive
to illustrate. When a consumer is obtaining a certain utility level from a video
game, whether this video game has many other players is not really important.
Since most of console video games do not have interaction between players on the
internet compared to the personal computer video games, the number of copies
sold by a video game title does not a↵ect how much an individual consumer en-
joys the game title. A similar story applies to the total number of consoles sold.
After a consumer has already owned the console that plays the game title, the
storage base of the console does not influence his utility of playing this specific
game title. I notice that the quality di↵erence measure loses the statistical signif-
icance as well. This is because that the quality di↵erence a↵ects the future resale
price more than it a↵ects the functions of a game title. For instance, Madden












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































certain utility levels by playing this game. When the Madden NFL 2010 game
generation are released, this introduction of a newer generation reduces the resale
price of the 2009 game title. The fancier the 2010 generation turns out to be, the
lower the resale price will be for the 2009 game title. Since I have included the
future resale price in my regression, the quality di↵erence does not influence the
utility function for the 2009 game title any more. It is reasonable to believe that
models four and five do a better job estimating the demand side than models
one, two, and three.
The main reason that models four and five are di↵erent from models two and
three is that the coe cient of the future resale price is allowed to deviate from
the coe cient of the current resale price. The value of the parameter  tells me
how much relative weight consumers put on the future resale price when they
decide whether to buy a product. A higher  values shows consumers pay more
attention to the used good market and are more likely to participate in the used
good market. The estimated  value is 6.14 and 4.50 in model four and model
five respectively. I can run an F-test to see whether the  value is significantly
di↵erent from 1 in each model. The test results show that both estimates for  are
greater than one. Since an econometrician is not able to fully observe the quality
of each game title, the quality measures are the best I can do to describe how good
each game title is. However, the quality measure does not fully capture the true
story. The future used good price, on the other hand, contains information about
the product quality levels that are not observable and are not listed on paper.
Once I eliminate the restrictions on the resale price during the construction of
rental price, the future used good price becomes more than a price indicator. It
contains unobserved product characteristics information. When the future resale
price is higher, the product of interest must have a better quality. This is why
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the results seem to state that consumers pay more attention to the used good
price instead of the new good price. Nonetheless, the  value shows that the
inclusion of the rental price in the demand side equation is an important and
correct choice.
Similar to the results from model five, the OLS regression generates a signifi-
cantly negative new good price and a statistically significantly positive used good
price. However, the magnitudes of these coe cients are smaller than the ones I
obtain for model five. Other estimates from OLS are slightly di↵erent than the
results for models four and five. This di↵erence shows that the consideration of
instrumental variables and endogeneity is necessary in the identification.
3.4.2 Price Elasticities and Rate of Substitution
Price Elasticities
After I have obtained the estimates for the demand side equation, I am able to
construct the self price elasticities for every one of the game titles in my data.
I use the results of model five to calculate the elasticity values. Since there are
hundreds of game titles in my data set, I choose the game titles that belong to the
FIFA Soccer game series to illustrate the significances of the elasticity estimates.
In order to show di↵erent features of the estimates, I show separate tables with
possible overlapped contents in them. The median elasticity for each game title
year are shown in the tables that follow.
Table(3.4) includes all elasticity estimates for the game generation FIFA Soc-
cer 2010. This generation is compatible to five consoles. Two of these five consoles
(Playstation 3 and XBOX 360) belong to the seventh generation consoles while
the other three (Nintendo DS, Playstation 2, and Playstation Portable) are of
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Price Elasticity
Game Generation Platform Year New Good Price Used Good Price
FIFA Soccer 10 DS 2009 -0.64 2.55
FIFA Soccer 10 PS2 2009 -0.64 2.74
FIFA Soccer 10 PSP 2009 -0.85 3.25
FIFA Soccer 10 PS3 2009 -1.22 4.10
FIFA Soccer 10 X360 2009 -1.27 4.09
This table contains all FIFA Soccer 2010 game titles.
Table 3.4: Price Elasticities Table One
Price Elasticity
Game Generation Platform Year New Good Price Used Good Price
FIFA Soccer 08 PS2 2008 -0.46 0.65
FIFA Soccer 08 PS2 2009 -0.46 0.33
FIFA Soccer 09 PS2 2008 -0.69 2.67
FIFA Soccer 09 PS2 2009 -0.69 1.81
FIFA Soccer 10 PS2 2009 -0.64 2.74
FIFA Soccer 08 PS3 2009 -0.69 1.06
FIFA Soccer 09 PS3 2008 -1.32 4.27
FIFA Soccer 09 PS3 2009 -1.10 2.76
FIFA Soccer 10 PS3 2009 -1.22 4.10
This table contains all FIFA Soccer game titles that are compatible to a
Playstation console.
Table 3.5: Price Elasticities Table Two
the sixth generation consoles. I observe higher elasticities for the seventh console
game titles. The same patterns can be found if I look at the estimates for the
game generation FIFA Soccer 2009.
I concentrate on the elasticity estimates for all Playstation 2 and Playstation
3 game titles. Table(3.5) shows the corresponding estimates. As a newer gam-
ing console, Playstation 3 game titles have higher elasticities than Playstation 2
game titles. Combined with the properties of Table(3.4), I find that consumers
who own the newest consoles are more price responsive. This is because that
consumers who own the newest generation gaming consoles are the ones who
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are more interested in playing video games. More interested players tend to pay
more attention to the market changes. Thus, these consumers tend to be more
responsive to a price change due to a higher awareness of other options in the
market.
One other key feature I observe is that the used good price elasticity has a
higher absolute value than the new good price elasticity for a game title year.
This matches the story where the used good price contains information about
unobserved quality. If a game title can be sold at a price that is one percent
higher, the percentage change of market share is going to be larger than the
change corresponding to a one percent drop in the new good price. This is
showing that consumers like video games that are going to generate higher future
resale price. This is caused by both a higher return from the secondary market
and a higher quality level of the product.
Rate of Substitution
Di↵erentiated product models assume that consumers obtain utility through all
di↵erent kinds of product characteristics. It is interesting to looking into how
consumers substitute between di↵erent product characteristics. Later discussions
will be based on the estimates obtained from model five in Table 3.3.
According to the model five estimates, a consumer is willing to pay one more
dollar in retail price for some product characteristic that is  ↵̂/ ̂ higher. This
product characteristic has  ̂ as the estimated coe cient in Eq(3.11). In this
case, if a game title is one dollar more expensive, an average consumer will still
be willing to purchase if the GSCritics rating is 0.022 higher. Given the rating
is ranged between 0 to 10. This estimate is quite reasonable.
Using the same idea, I can try to show how people’s willingness to pay changes
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with respect to time. As the coe cient for weeks2 is very small, I can ignore
this term at the beginning of a game title’s life span. I can calculate that an
average consumer is willing to to pay one dollar higher in retail price if a game
title is approximately 0.64 weeks (approximately 4.5 days) younger right after
the release of a game title. A consumer is willing to pay twenty dollars higher in
the retail price is a game is around three months newer. This matches the price
trends I see on Fig 1.1.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter of the dissertation attempts to develop the traditional di↵erentiated
product models in a way of adjusting the price measures. Authors of earlier lit-
erature employ retail prices as the prices paid by consumers. However, according
to planned obsolescence literature and the theoretical model in Chapter 2, the
future resale price is not negligible. Thus, I propose various ways of constructing
the rental price, which is the di↵erence between the retail price and potential
resale price.
According to the estimation results and some calculations based on those
results, including rental price instead of retail price generates more accurate and
reasonable estimates. Consumers become more likely to purchase a video game
title not only when the retail price is lower, but when the future resale price
is higher as well. The estimation results infer that future resale prices contain
information that is related to the unobserved product characteristics.
For future expansion of this line of research, a development from a static model
to a dynamic model is certainly feasible. Agents are forming expectations in each
period and react to di↵erent expected future situations. A dynamic model will
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be able to capture such evolution better. One can look into the determination of
the used good price further. As pointed out before, it is possible to reveal some
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Appendix A
Case I: p2 s2q2 q1 <
p2
q2
< s2q1  1










], and ( s2q1 , 1]. I
need to analyze consumers’ choices when x1 in located in each one of the four
intervals.









In this case, all consumers who do not purchase in the first period will not buy,
and consumers who have purchased product version 1 will all sell their used
products and some of them will purchase a new unit.




), U10 > max{U11, U12}; 8x 2 [
p2
q2
, 1], U12   max{U10, U11}.
I do not have equilibrium results since consumers with indexes no less than x1
will be willing to supply in the used good market and no other consumers want
to purchase in the used good market.









In this case, I have a similar situation as in Case I-I.




), U10 > max{U11, U12}; 8x 2 [
p2
q2
, 1], U12   max{U10, U11}.
I do not have equilibrium results in this case due to the same reason from Case
I-I.
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 x1 < s2q
1
 1
For all consumers whose consumer index smaller than p2q2 , they will choose to stay
out of the market. For consumers with indexes between p2q2 and x1, they will buy
a new good in the second period. Consumers with indexes greater than x1, they
will choose to participate in the secondary market by selling their used product
and purchase a product version 2 in the second period.
8x  p2
q2
, U00   max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 (
p2
q2
, x1], U02   max{U00, U01};
8x 2 (x1, 1], U12 > max{U10, U11}.
There is no subgame perfect equilibrium in this case since the used good supply
will be positive, while the used good demand is zero.








 x1  1
For consumers with consumer indexes smaller than p2q2 , they will stay out of the
market. Consumers, whose consumer indexes are between p2q2 and x1, will purchase
a new product version 2. The rest of the consumers purchase in the first period,
sell their used products and purchase again in the second period.
8x  p2
q2
, U00   max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 (
p2
q2
, x1], U02   max{U00, U01};
8x 2 (x1, 1], U12 > max{U10, U11}.




< p2q2 < 1 <
p2 s2
q2 q1
In this case, x1 could be located in three intervals since x1 will not exceed 1. I
will analyze all three possibilities and show that a subgame perfect equilibrium
does not exist in this case.





< 1 < p2 s2q2 q1
For all consumers who do not purchase in the first period, they will still not
purchase anything in the second period. For consumers who have consumer
indexes between x1 and 1, they will either sell their used products and stay out
of the market or choose to keep their used product.




), U10 > max{U11, U12}; 8x 2 [
s2
q2
, 1], U11   max{U11, U12}.
In this case, there is positive supply in the used good market but zero demand.
I do not have equilibrium results.
B.0.2 Case II-II: s2q1  x1 <
p2
q2
< 1 < p2 s2q2 q1
For consumers who do not have a first period purchase, they will stay out of the
market if their consumer indexes are smaller than s2q1 and they will buy a unit of
the used product version 1 if their indexes are between s2q1 and x1. For consumers
who have purchased in the first period, they will keep their product version 1 if
their indexes are between x1 and 1, they will keep their used product 1.
8x  s2
q1
, U00 > max{U01, U02}; 8x 2 (
s2
q1
, x1], U01 > max{U00, U02};
8x 2 [x1, 1], U11   max{U10, U12}.
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I can adopt the same reasoning as in Case II-I and conclude that I will not have
a subgame perfect equilibrium in this case.





< 1 < p2 s2q2 q1
I can derive the second period utility function orders for all consumers as follows:
8x  s2
q1






], U01   max{U00, U02};
8x 2 (p2
q2
, x1), U02 > max{U00, U01}; 8x 2 [x1, 1], U11   max{U10, U12}.





I hope to calculate the di↵erence between the characteristics of the game title of
interest and the respective characteristics of the newest generation of the game
series. If the game title of interest and the newer game generation are both
compatible to the same console, the quality di↵erence will be measured by the
characteristics di↵erences between the newest generation game title for the same
console and the game title of interest. However, it is possible that the newer
generation of the game series will not be compatible to the same console during
some weeks or not at all. This could be caused by either the rm has decided not
to produce game titles for a certain console any more or the rm has not released
the new generation for that platform yet. In either case, the quality di↵erence
measure will be the di↵erence of the best selling game title in the next generation
and the game title of interest. For example, when the game title of interest is the
Madden NFL 2008 for Xbox360, which was the newest game generation in the
Madden NFL game series on console Xbox360 during the ma jority of 2008, the
quality di↵erence measure were zero before the Madden NFL 2009 was released.
After the Madden NFL 2009 was released and it is immediately compatible to
Xbox360, the quality di↵erence became the di↵erence between the characteristics
of the Madden NFL 2009 for Xbox360 and the Madden NFL 2008 for Xbox360.
Suppose the Madden NFL 2008 for PS2 is the game title of interest and EA sports
decides not to produce any more Madden NFL game titles for PS2 after 2008, the
quality di↵erence measure for Madden NFL 2008 for PS2 after the introduction
of Madden NFL 2009 generation will be the characteristics di↵erence between
the best selling Madden NFL 2009 game title and Madden NFL 2008 for PS2.
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Appendix D
First Stage Results for Model
Five in Table 3.3
In the first stage of a panel data IV method, each endogenous variable will become
the dependent variable in a regression and the instrumental variables and other
exogenous variables are the dependent variables in the same equation. Table D.1
shows the first stage results for G2SLS random-e↵ects IV regression for model
five in Table 3.3. It is quite clear that the choices of instruments fit well in the
regressions.
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